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The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine the political and fiscal impact 
of the Line Item Veto on the budgeting process. It examines the history of the line item 
veto prior to the congressional elections of 1994, and then considers the legislative 
history of the Line Item Veto Act during the l04th Congress (1995-96). It explains the 
various arguments surrounding the requirement for a line item veto, and explores the 
methods that supporters employed to provide this power to the President. It also 
considers the various legal challenges to the Line Item Veto Act, culminating with the 
1998 Supreme Court ruling that the Act was unconstitutional. The chief fmding of the 
thesis is that, in the Act's only year of employment, it failed to have a significant impact 
on the budgeting process. President Clinton primarily used the measure to trim items 
from appropriations bills, most of which came on the Military Construction 
Appropriations Act. Congress and the federal courts overturned nearly half of his 1997 
cancellations prior to the Supreme Court's ruling that the Act was unconstitutional. 
While it introduced a new dynamic into the budgeting process, it did not represent a 
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When the framers of the Constitution established 
procedures for the passage of laws, they limited the 
President to three specific actions. First, upon 
presentment of legislation by Congress, he could sign the 
legislation into law. Second, he could return it to 
Congress with his objections. Third, he could allow it to 
become law without his signature. Supporters of the line 
item veto have long sought to increase the President's 
power by allowing him to amend legislation at the time he 
signed it into law. Realizing that the Constitution did 
not provide for this, they sought passage of a 
constitutional amendment. However, support for such an 
amendment failed to materialize and by the 1980's 
proponents began introducing measures to provide that power 
by statutory means. 
The history of the line item veto in America can be 
traced back to the Civil War when the Confederate states 
adopted the measure in their constitution. Following the 
war, most new states added it to their state constitutions. 
Currently, 43 states provide their governors with some form 
of line item veto. 1 
Following the Civil War, the nature of legislation 
changed considerably at the federal level. Congress 
enacted spending measures wi th a variety of related and 
unrelated items contained in legislative riders. By the 
Consti tution, the President was forced to either sign or 
veto the entire measure. Even though he may have strongly 
opposed the riders passed by Congress, the President was 
limited in his ability to stop them. Congress' reliance on 
legislative riders led President Ulysses S. Grant in 1873, 
to call for the first line item veto. 2 Since that time 
several presidents, incl uding Hayes, Arthur, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Reagan, Bush and Clinton 
have called for such authority.3 
Short of having the line item veto, presidents have 
used impoundments to control what they determined to be 
wasteful spending. Richard Nixon relied heavily on 
impoundments to implement his spending priorities. In 
response to his far-reaching use of impoundments, Congress 
I U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, "Analysis of Provisions Contained in the Line Item Veto 
Act Relating to Limited Tax Benefits," Jan 3, 1997, p. 7. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ross, Russell M., and Schwengel, Fred, "An Item Veto for the President?" Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 12 (Winter 1982), p. 68. 
2 
passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) to limit the ability of future 
presidents to impound funds. By the 1980' s, skyrocketing 
deficits and the Supreme Court's decision that a portion of 
the Impoundment Control Act was unconstitutional, led to 
renewed debate over the necessity of a line item veto. 
From 1984 to 1994 conservative Republicans sought 
passage of a line item veto measure by statutory means. To 
accomplish this they drafted legislation that increased the 
President's power to enact rescissions after he had signed 
a bill into law. There was generally little support for 
these measures until a Republican majority was elected to 
Congress in 1994. As one of its major policy objectives, 
the Republican majority called for passage of the Line Item 
Veto Act. President Clinton supported the measure as well, 
and on April 9, 1996, signed the Act into law as P.L. 104-
130. The Act was available for use by the President on 
January 1, 1997. 
Though the Line Item Veto was hailed as a deficit 
control measure, it failed to have much impact in its first 
and only year of employment. The manner in which the Act 
was drafted severely limited its ability to control the 
deficit. The President could only use the Line Item Veto 
3 
on discretionary budget authority, new direct spending and 
targeted tax benefits. He was unable to cancel spending 
from previously enacted entitlement programs, such as 
Social Security and Medicare, which comprise the fastest 
growing portions of the federal budget. 
In its first year, the President exercised the Line 
i tern Veto 82 times, striking provisions from 11 laws. Of 
these cancellations, 52 came in defense related bills. 
Congress subsequently overturned 38 cancellations from the 
Mili tary Construction Appropriations Act. 4 An addi tional 
cancellation from the Treasury Appropriations Act was 
struck down in Federal District Court. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, the cancellations that 
remained in effect totaled $569 million over five years. 5 
This amount is insignificant when compared to overall 
discretionary budget authority of $526 billion for 1997. 6 
After passage of the Line Item Veto Act, opponents 
challenged its constitutionality in the federal courts. On 
June 25, 1998, as a resul t of two lawsuits by plainti ffs 
who claimed a concrete personal injury because of the Act, 
4 Congressional Budget Office, 1998, "The Line item Veto Act After One Year," CBO Memorandum, 
(April) pp. 11-14. 
s Ibid., p. 13. 
6 Ibid., p. 14. 
4 
the Supreme Court struck down the measure, stating that it 
violated the Presentment Clause of the Constitution. 
Though some ardent supporters vow to revive the 
measure, there appears to be little support for such a move 
among most members of Congress. Many former supporters, 
outraged at the President's use of the Line Item Veto, 
gradually became opponents of the measure. While the long-
term future of the Act is uncertain, the Court's ruling 
closed, for now, another chapter in the history of the line 
item veto. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question to be addressed in this 
thesis is: What has been the political and fiscal impact of 
the Line item Veto Act since its passage in 1996? 
Subsidiary questions are: 
1. What is the history of the line item veto? 
2. What was the nature of the political debate in the 
104 th Congress that shaped passage of the Line Item 
Veto Act? 
3. How has the Line Item Veto been used to control 
federal spending? 
4. What rationale did the President use for employing 
the Line Item Veto? 
5. How did Congress respond to the President's use of 
the Line item Veto? 
5 
6. What have been the results of legal challenges to 
the Line Item Veto Act? 
C. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into four parts. First, it 
provides an historical overview of the line item veto. It 
will trace the history of the line item veto to provide 
understanding of its beginnings and original purpose. The 
historicpl perspective will present the main arguments for 
and against the measure. It will also examine the various 
types of proposed item veto legislation, and the reasons 
for these different approaches. 
The thesis will then examine the legislative history 
of the Line Item Veto Act in the l04 th Congress. Passage of 
the measure in Congress will be thoroughly considered to 
include the political debates that shaped its passage in 
each House. The thesis will also demonstrate how final 
passage of the Line Item Veto Act was affected by a 
bi tterly fought battle over the federal budget. Finally, 
it will provide a general overview of the measure with 
• 
emphasis on some parts of the law that will be examined 
later. This section of the thesis will end wi th final 
passage of the measure. 
The third part of the thesis will examine the fiscal 
and political impact of the Line Item Veto Act in the lOSth 
6 
Congress. It will demonstrate how the measure was used and 
provide insight into its 
controlling federal spending. 
overall effectiveness in 
It will look at two cases 
where Congress and the federal courts later overturned the 
President's cancellations. It will also examine the effect 
of legal challenges on the President's use of the measure. 
Finally, it will consider the nature of the shift in 
budgetary powers from Congress to the President. 
The fourth part of the thesis will examine legal 
challenges to the Act's constitutionality. It will discuss 
the origin and final outcome of four separate cases brought 
against the Act. It will explain the arguments presented 
by the plaintiffs as well as the Supreme Court's rulings on 
legal standing. This portion of the thesis will conclude 
wi th the Supreme Court ruling which overturned the Line 
Item Veto Act. 
D. ME THODOLOGY 
The data upon which this thesis is based will be 
derived from a literature search of journals, congressional 
records, White House releases and periodicals. Information 
will be obtained from the Office of Management and Budget, 
the Congressional Budget Office, congressional committees, 
and rulings in federal court. Some of the information 
7 
provided in tables will be derived from computer-aided 
searches of the Thomas website. The information obtained 
from this site will deal directly with proposed legislation 
and congressional reports. 
8 
II. HISTORY OF THE LINE ITEM VETO 
When President Reagan asked for the line item veto in 
his 1984 state of the Union address, he re-focused national 
debate on a subject which had not been seriously considered 
since 1957. This was the last time Congress held hearings 
on the impact of providing such authority to the President. 
Wi thin three months of Reagan's request, the Subcommittee 
on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary convened to hear arguments for and against the 
line item veto. Several senators and experts testified on 
the efficacy of the line item veto in controlling wasteful 
spending. However, unlike past debates on the subject, 
this would be the beginning of a twelve-year controversy, 
which would result in passage of the Line Item Veto Act in 
1996 (PL 104-130). 
A. EARLY YEARS (1861-1974) 
The line item veto can be traced back to the Civil War 
when the Confederate States of America adopted the measure 
in their Constitution. The author of the measure, Robert 
H. Smith, stated that it provided the President with the 
means to "arrest corrupt or illegitimate expenditures. Hl 
1 Ross, Russell M., and Schwengel, Fred, "An Item Veto for the President?" Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 12 (Winter 1982), p. 68. 
9 
Article 1, section 7, of the Confederate Constitution 
stated that "The President may approve any appropriation 
and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill." 
Though he had the power to strike individual items of 
appropriation, Jefferson Davis, the only Confederate 
president, never actually exercised the authori ty. 2 
Following the War, item vetoes spread to every new state, 
except Nevada, as well as many of the older states. 3 
The u.s. Constitution had never provided such 
authori ty to the President. The Framers fear of a strong 
Executi ve led them only reluctantly to provide the 
President with any veto power at all. Alexander Hamilton 
stated in Federalist no. 73 that: 
Without the [absolute or qualified negativef the 
[Executive] would be absolutely unable to defend 
himself against the depredations of the 
[Legislature]. He might gradually be stripped of 
his authorities by successive resolutions, or 
annihilated by a single vote. 4 
In providing this power to the President, the Framers set 
limits on the extent to which it could be used. First, it 
2 Ibid., Note 4, p. 78. 
3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Hearings on the 
Line-Item Veto, "Opening Statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman" Apr 9, 1984, P 1. (Hereafter, 
1984 Hearings). 
• The term 'absolute or qualified negative' was used to describe the Executive's ability to disapprove, or 
veto, legislation, which had been passed by the Congress. 
4 Garry Wills, The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, (New York: 
Bantam Books), p. 372. 
10 
was only to be used to veto bills in their entirety. 
Article 1, section 7 of the u.s. Constitution states: 
Every bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it 
become law, be presented to the President of the 
Uni ted States; if he approve he shall sign it, 
but if not he shall return it with his objections 
to that House in which it shall have originated. 
George Washington stated the intent of the Framers when he 
wrote, "From the nature of the Constitution, I must approve 
all the parts of a Bill or reject it in totO."5 
Second, Congress could override the President's veto 
with a two-thirds vote in each house. These two 
limitations on the President's veto power were part of the 
"original understanding that the veto would he used only 
rarely, and certainly not as a means of systematic policy 
control over the legislative branch."6 
Though, heretofore, the President had never had such a 
precise means of reaching into a bill and striking portions 
to which he objected, by 1873, the nature of legislation 
had changed considerably. Since the Civil War, the 
Congress had relied heavily on the practice of attaching 
legislative riders to appropriations bills to ensure 
passage of spending measures that would most likely not 
S Fitzpatrick, John c., Writings of George Washington, (ed. 1940), vol. 33, p. 96. 
6 Proposals for Line-Item Veto Authority, American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis, 1984, p. 2. 
11 
pass on their own right. These riders had become so 
prevalent by 1873, that President Grant recommended 
Congress pass an amendment "to authori ze the Executive to 
approve of so much of any measure passing the two Houses of 
Congress as his judgement may dictate, without approving 
the whole. ,,7 
On January 18, 1876, the first amendment to provide 
the President wi th item veto authority was introduced by 
James C. Faulkner of West Virginia. 8 Since that time, 
Presidents Hayes, Arthur, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, 
Eisenhower, and Reagan have called for similar authority. 9** 
At the time of the 1984 hearings on the line item veto, 
Senator Hatch stated that "over 140 similar proposals have 
been introduced in congress."IO Yet, he continued, "In over 
100 years since the first item veto proposal appeared in 
Congress, only four hearings have been held on the 
subject."ll Between his subcommittee's hearings and passage 
of the Line Item Veto Act in 1996, the number of proposals 
7 Wilkinson, Vernon L. "Observations on the Item Veto," Aug 13, 1936, p. 4. 
8 Hatch, (1984 Hearings) p. 2. 
9 Ross and Schwengel, p. 70. 
""In their article, Ross and Schwengellist the first six presidents to call for item veto authority. Reagan was 
added to their original list. Since 1984, Bush and Clinton can be added to the list of presidents to call for 
this authority. 
'0 Hatch, (1984 Hearings) p. 2. 
"Ibid. 
12 
would increase by more than one hundred-twenty, and the 
number of hearings would increase to eleven. 
B. MOMJm'1'UM BU:ILD:ING AND TD 98th CONGRESS (1974-1984) 
President Reagan's call for the line item veto came at 
a time when the Federal Government was experiencing huge 
budget deficits, which were forecast to continue 
indefinitely. In his first three years as President, the 
federal debt had grown from $785 billion to $1.1 trillion. 12 
To contend with ever-growing deficits, Reagan offered the 
line item veto to reach into appropriations bills and veto 
specific items as one solution. 
I also propose improvements in the budgeting 
process. Some 43 of our 50 states grant their 
Governors the right to veto individual items in 
appropriation bills without having to veto the 
entire bill. California is one of those 43 
states. As Governor, I found this 'line item 
veto' was a powerful tool against wasteful or 
extravagant spending. 13 
Though this address brought the line item veto back 
into the spotlight of public debate, such legislation had 
been introduced consistently in previous congresses. 
Representative Charles E. Bennett (D) from Florida had been 
introducing legislation in each congress for years, even 
before the 1974 Budget Act. In 1975, as the Congress was 
12 Budget of the United States Government, 1998, "Analytical Perspectives," Table 12-6. 
13 Reagan, Ronald, "State of the Union Address," Jan 25, 1984. 
13 
insti tuting its new budget procedures, Representative 
Bennett introduced H.J. Res. 617, calling for an amendment 
to the Constitution to give the President item veto 
authority on appropriations bills. Though the Congress had 
just recently passed legislation to reduce the President's 
ability to impound budget authority, Representative Bennett 
essentially sought to do the opposite. The resolution had 
no cosponsors and was referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee where it subsequently died. Bennett would 
continue to introduce such legislation for the next nine 
congresses, until he retired at the end of the 102nd 
Congress. 
Disputes with President Nixon over impoundments had 
resulted in passage of the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (PL 93-344), which led to a 
re-definition of 
spending. Under 
the President's role in controlling 
the new Act, Impoundments were divided 
into two categories, rescissions and deferrals. Deferrals 
occur when the President chooses not to spend funds 
immediately because he believes doing so would not be 
practical or wise. In such instances, he can propose to 
defer the spending until a later time. Congress can force 
him to spend the funds by passing legislation in either the 
14 
House or the Senate, which instructs him to do SO.14 
Otherwise, the President has up to a year to spend those 
funds. 
Rescissions occur when the President decides not to 
spend budget authority at all. Congress has 45 days to 
pass legislation upholding the President's rescissions. If 
they fail to act at all then the money must be spent after 
the 45 days. 15 
Most item veto legislation introduced since 1975 has 
not called for true item veto authority. Instead, 
supporters of this new power have generally sought enhanced 
rescission authority. In some respects, the current Act 
more accurately provides the President with enhanced 
rescission authority, because of the action required by 
Congress to overturn his objections. Table (1) outlines the 
differences between these types of legislation. 
An item veto is defined as, "The executive power to 
block separate parts of a bill. ,,16 It, therefore, becomes 
important to define what the parts of the bill are, or what 
constitutes an item of appropriation. On this subject 
14 Lowe, Margaret, 1975, "1974 Impoundment Act: Time for Testing," Congressional Quarterly, (Apr 26), 
D.860. 
ls Ibid. 
16 Shafritz, Jay M., The HarperCollins Dictionary of American Government and Politics, (New York: 
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rescinding all or 
part of any 
spending in an 
appropriations 
bill after he has 
signed the bill 
into law. 
Congre •• 
Any rescission would 
go into effect if 
Congress failed to 
overturn it. Both 
Houses would pass a 
motion of disapproval. 
The President could 
veto this measure, 
which would require a 
2/3 vote in both 
Houses to over-ride. 
The veto would go into 
effect unless Congress 
overrode it with a 2/3 
vote in both Houses 
Any rescission would 
go into effect only if 
both the House and the 
Senate approved it by 
simple majority. 
Congress would be 
required to vote on 
the president's 
rescission proposal. 
The rescission takes 
effect only if both 
chambers approve it by 
a simple majority. 
Congress is not 
required to act on the 
proposed rescissions. 
If they fail to act, 
then the money must be 
spent after 45 days. 
COIIIID8nt 
Like the line item 
veto, it would 
ultimately allow the 
president to force 
Congress to mount a 
2/3 vote in both 
chambers to override 
the rescission. 
As with enhanced 
rescission authority, 
the line-item veto 
would give the 
president substantial 
authority to control 
congressional 
spending as long as 
he maintained a one-
third plus one 
minority in the House 
or Senate. 
This would simply 
require the House and 
Senate to vote on the 
proposed rescissions. 
The rescissions would 
go into effect if 
both Houses approved 
them by simple 
majority. 
This rescission 
authority was defined 
in the Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974. 
It is still available 
for use by the 
president today. 
17 Hager, George, 1993, "GOP, Black Caucus Force Delay in Line-Item Veto Debate," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Apr 23), p. 1009 . 
••• This table has been modified slightly from the original version. Descriptions of some of the measlD'es 
were changed due to the passage of the Line Item Veto Act in 1996. 
16 
there is no clear answer. A Congressional Research Service 
Memorandum explains: 
There is no universally accepted definition of an 
'item.' Many appropriations occur as lump-sum 
amounts in the public law, with the details of 
itemization contained in report language; an item 
veto could not delete such items in reports. IS 
Item veto authority would be considerably more precise than 
what is currently available, but the President would still 
lack the ability to strike specific provisions to which he 
objected. More traditionally, presidents have relied on 
impoundments to control spending in specific areas. Even 
with item veto authority, such impoundments as defined by 
the 1974 Budget Act would likely still provide a more 
precise means for the President to enforce his spending 
priorities. 
Arguments for and against item veto authority have 
generally focused on whether Congress should be forced to 
act to overturn the President's obj ections. Opponents of 
any such measure argue that this requirement would 
substantially weaken the power of Congress in relation to 
the President. Furthermore, they argue that no such power 
was ever intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Any 
legislation that required Congress to act to overturn the 
18 McMurtry Virginia A., 1994, ''The President and the Budget: Expanded Impotmdment and Item Veto 
Proposals," Congressional Research Service (Oct. 6) p. CRS-IO. 
17 
L....-_________________________________ ~ ____ ~ __ _ 
President's objections to parts of a bill would violate 
Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution. 
Due to the historic view that this power is not 
granted in the Constitution, most legislation introduced in 
the 1970' s and early 1980' s called for a constitutional 
amendment. The first statutory measure that sought to 
provide this power to the President was H.R. 6686, 
sponsored by Representative Bill Archer(R) of Texas during 
the 97 th Congress. Once again this legislation was referred 
to the House Judiciary Committee and no further action was 
taken on it. 
Through the 1980' s and early 1990' s, the number of 
resolutions calling for enhanced rescission or item veto 
power for the President continued to increase. Table (2) 
shows the number of statutory measures and resolutions that 
called for a constitutional amendment introduced in the 97 th 
through the 103 rd Congress. 
As can be seen from the table, congressional support 
for some type of item veto measure continued to increase. 
These bills can be broken down into four broad types. 
First, a significant number of them simply called for the 
President to have the authority to veto line items in 
appropriations bills. Another type would allow the 
18 
President to either rescind or reduce budget authority on 
appropriations items. A third type would enroll each item 
of appropriation into a separate bill for presentment to 
the President. This was ostensibly to avoid a question 
over the constitutionality of the measure. 
~able (2) 
Item Veto Mea.ure. 
Introduced in Congre •• **** 
Conqress Bills Aaendments 
94 th 0 1 
95th 0 5 
96th 0 3 
97 th 1 3 
98 th 4 13 
99th 7 10 
100th 8 9 
101 st 14 13 
102nd 9 20 
103rd 17 18 
A fourth type of measure can be characterized as a 
legislative and line item veto. Congress had. long used the 
so-called legislative veto, to control policy decisions in 
executive branch agencies. Legislative vetoes were written 
•••• Information provided in this chart was compiled through a computer-aided search in the "Thomas" 
Website at http:// thomas.loc.gov/. The search query was "item veto" through the Bill Summary & Search 
page. The search was conducted in each of the previous Congresses and a summary for each bill was 
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into a variety of laws which authorized the establishment 
of these agencies. According to Diane Granat of 
Congressional Quarterly, "a legislative veto is a tool by 
which a single congressional committee, one house of 
Congress or both the House and Senate may overturn an 
executi ve branch regulation or order. ,,19 Congressional 
committees could use this veto power to influence decision 
making on policies of executive branch agencies. 
One of the most important Supreme Court cases 
. involving legislative vetoes was the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha. In this case, Congress 
used a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952, which gave either chamber the authority to veto a 
decision by the INS. Under this provision the Congress 
vetoed a 1974 decision by the INS not to deport Jagdish 
Chadha, a student from Kenya who had overstayed his visa. 20 
Chadha brought suit challenging the legislative veto and in 
1983, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in his favor. Stanley 
Brand, legal counsel for the House of Representatives 
obtained. The search also returned several bills, which called for enhanced rescission authority, but only 
those bills which were similarly listed as item veto measures were retained. 
19 Granat, Diane, 1983, "Legislative Vetoes Are Passed Despite High Court Decisioo," Congressional 
Quarterly, (Oct 29) p. 2235. 
20 Weiss, Laura and Witt, Elder, 1982, "Battle over Legislative Veto Coming to a Head Feb. 22 Before the 
Supreme Court," Congressional Ouarterly, (Feb 6) p. 202. 
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quipped, "It took the Court 18 months to screw up what it 
took Congress fifty years to set Up."21 
Implications for the ruling were wide spread. Several 
hundred laws had been passed with legislative veto 
provisions, including the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The Supreme Court's 
ruling effectively nullified the provisions in the law, 
which dealt with how Congress overrides presidential 
deferrals. Dale Tate of Congressional Quarterly wrote, 
"since deferral resolutions do not have to be signed by the 
President, most authorities agree they fall within the 
legislative veto category struck down by the Supreme 
Court. "22 
Within the four general types of line item veto 
proposals there are several distinguishing characteristics. 
According to the American Enterprise Institute, by March of 
1984, 14 such proposals had been introduced in the 98 th 
congress. 23 Of these, nine would allow line item veto of 
appropriations only, and three would allow the President to 
reduce appropriations. Five would authorize the President 
21 Pressman, Steven, 1983, "Congress Considers Choices in Legislative Veto Aftermath," Congressional 
Quarterly. (July 2) p 1327. 
22 Tate, Dale, 1982, "High Court Decision Reopens Dispute Over Impoundments; Congress Loses 
Spending Tool," Congressional Quarterly, (July 2) p 1331. 
23 Proposals for Line-Item Veto Authority, p.8. 
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to veto items of appropriations on legislative riders. 
Eight would authorize the President to only veto 
appropriations for executive branch agencies, exempting 
both the legislative and judicial branches from this 
authority. Yet another proposal would allow the President 
to veto items of appropriation from any branch of 
government, but would exempt national defense bills from 
that authority.24 
Furthermore, two proposals would provide for 
congressional override of the presidential line item veto 
by a simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority. 
One proposal would authorize the legislative veto. Only 
three of the fourteen proposals would authorize the line 
item veto by statutory means, rather than amendment to the 
Consti tution. 25 
The proposals introduced in the 98 th Congress provide 
an excellent view of the manner by which legislators have 
sought to enhance the President's power. The most 
significant difference between past proposals and what 
occurred in the 1980's and 1990's, was the rapid increase 
in the number of statutory measures which sought to provide 
this power. Throughout the long history of line item veto 
24 Ibid., pp.8-1O. 
2S Ibid. 
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proposals, the majority had focused on the need to amend 
the Constitution. The most likely way to accomplish this 
would be to get two-thirds of both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives to pass a resolution and then get three-
fourths of the states to ratify it. However, even with the 
increased interest in the subject and Republican control of 
the Senate, this was unlikely. 
Though the line item veto was a tool generally 
championed by fiscal conservatives, there were several such 
conservatives that refused to support it. One of these was 
Senator Mark Hatfield(R) from Oregon, Chairman of the 
Senate Appropriations Cornrni ttee. During hearings on the 
line item veto in 1984, Senator Hatfield expressed his 
reservation to such a measure, stating that "As a means to 
balance the budget, the line-item veto is all but 
meaningless. ,,26 This was because proposals left out the 
fastest growing portions of the budget, namely 
entitlements. Of the areas that the line item veto could 
affect, he continued, non-defense discretionary spending 
would bare "the brunt of spending reductions.,,27 
26 Hatfield, Mark 0., (1984 Hearings) p. 19. 
27 Ibid. 
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Senator Hatfield was also concerned that the line item 
veto would cause a significant shift in the balance of 
power between the legislative and executive branch. 
The line-item veto will empower the President to 
go beyond the simple control on overall spending, 
and allow him to virtually dictate spending 
priorities over individual programs and 
acti vi ties. Wi th this power the President can 
frustrate a decision of the Congress on any 
individual program, be it for political or 
ideological reasons, or simply because of 
personal bias. 28 
Representati ve Mickey Edwards (R) from Oklahoma, in a 
prepared statement, used a specific example to explain his 
opposition to the item veto. One of the failures of such a 
measure would involve the President's role in agreeing to 
foreign aid. He wrote, 
As with any other piece of legislation, the 
process involves compromise and balance. The 
fact that one country may receive only 
humani tarian aid, another receives only rnili tary 
and security aid and a third receives both kinds 
of aid is a matter of policy- Not just numbers. 
For a president to remove any portion of that 
bill, shifts the policy of the United States 
because the remainder becomes law. 29 
Representative Edwards went on to ask, what will happen to 
the minority's ability to pass legislation if both the 
Presidency and the Congress are controlled by the same 
party and the President has line item veto authority? "The 
28 Ibid. 
29 Edwards, Mickey (1984 Hearings) p. 27. 
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issue is much larger than discussions over pork-barrel 
spending," he concluded. 30 
One of the leading Republican senators who favored the 
line item veto was Senator Mack Mattingly from Georgia. 
Senator Mattingly was the author of two resolutions S. J. 
Res. 178 and S. 1921, which called for the line item veto. 
Of these, S.J. Res. 178 called for a constitutional 
amendment and S. 1921 sought to provide statutory power to 
the President. In testimony before the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, he pointed out that due to changes which the 
Framers could not have envisioned, the budget process 
requires passage of a line item veto. 
I think when our Founding Fathers set up our 
system of Government, they could not see 200 
years down the road of history. Congress was in 
session just a few weeks of the year, and those 
appropriation bills were very small and 
manageable. But times have changed. The 
entire Federal budget for 1790 would not even pay 
for the paper clips that the bureaucracy now 
wastes each year. There are just 13 
appropriation bills. Often the country is 
operated by continuing resolutions passed at 
night, or the last day. 31 
Senator Mattingly went on to say that if the President 
vetoes these large bills because of some smaller portions 
30 Ibid., p. 28. 
31 Mattingly, Mack (1984 Hearings) p. 42. 
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to which he objects, then he risks shutting down vital 
functions of the government that he wishes to preserve. 
A written statement by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
Donald T. Regan, echoed Mattingly's point. 
The absence of line-item veto authority from the 
Consti tution does not reflect a decision by the 
Framers to deny that power to the President; the 
Framers simply never considered the issue. 
Undoubtedly, they anticipated that Congress would 
provide funds by passing separate appropriations 
bills for discrete programs or activities, rather 
than omnibus bills encompassing a variety of 
related and unrelated matters. 32 
Under the current system, supporters argued the President 
was forced to accept an entire bill with all of its 
extraneous provisions or veto the entire bill and risk 
shutting down the government. Though supporters may 
reluctantly agree that the line item veto could not have a 
significant impact on the deficit since it focused only on 
appropriations bills, they viewed it as an important means 
for limiting logrolling, which was considered a major cause 
of pork-barrel spending. In general terms though, it was 
being touted as one of the two important instruments (the 
other being a balanced budget amendment) to bring runaway 
deficits under control. For all the debate in the 98 th 
Congress over item veto authority, the only vote came as a 
32 Regan, Donald T. (1984 Hearings) p. 173. 
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resul t of an amendment proposed by Senator Mattingly to 
H.R. 2163, the Sport Fish Restoration Revenue Act. This 
bill, which authorized funds for the National Recreational 
Boating Safety Fund for state recreational boating safety 
programs, became the recipient for everyone who had a 
rider. Well over 50 amendments were proposed to this bill, 
some dealing with deficit reduction legislation. 
Among these amendments was S. AMDT. 3045, to authorize 
the President to use the item veto for fiscal years 1985 
and 1986. The amendment had four cosponsors-- Senators 
Dixon, Evans, Exon and D'Amato. On May 3, Senator 
Mattingly proposed the amendment. Senator Chiles (D) from 
Florida then raised a point of order, challenging the 
amendment on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. 
Mattingly moved to table (or kill) the point of order, but 
his motion was rejected 45-46. Then the point of order was 
upheld by a vote of 56-34. 33 In the vote to uphold Senator 
Chiles' point of order, Republicans voted 21-30 against, 
while Democrats voted 35-4 in favor. 34 
This vote had provided the sense of the Senate for the 
98 th C ongress. Senators overwhelmingly believed that item 
veto authority could not be provided to the President 
33 Congressional Record, (May 3, 1984), p. S5355. 
34 Senate Recorded Votes 86 and 87, Congressional Quarterly, May 5, 1984, p. 1064. 
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through statutory means, and were furthermore, not ready to 
provide him with that authori ty. Though the issue would 
continue to garner support, it had run its course in the 
98 th Congress. 
c. ITEM VETO ALREADY IN THE CONSTITUTION (1985-1994) 
Debate on the line item veto continued over the next 
several congresses. Fiscal conservatives championed the 
measure for its deficit-cutting ability, and pushed for 
amendments to legislation on numerous occasions. Though 
the votes were generally rejected, it was clear that the 
issue was not going away. Table (3) is a list of votes on 
item veto legislation in the 99 th through 103~ Congresses. 
As can be seen from the table, supporters had Ii ttle 
success in passing their amendments. The notable exception 
was S. ADMT. 264 in the 103 rd Congress. Thi s amendmen t 
stated simply that it was the "Sense of the Senate that the 
President should be granted line-i tern veto authori ty over 
i terns of appropriation and tax expendi tures." It further 
provided that "each item of appropriation or each tax 
expenditure should be separately enrolled for presentment 
to the President; and the new authority [should] expire at 
the conclusion of the 103~ Congress.,,35 
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after motion to 
invoke cloture 
failed 3 times. 
Motion to waive 
Budget Act 
rejected. 
On agreeing to the 
amendment. 
Motion to waive 
Budget Act 
rejected. 
House and Senate 
Conference Report 
on Transportation. 
Motion to waive 
179-242 Budget Act 
rejected. 
73-24 On agreeing to the 
amendment 
Sense of the Senate 
that the president 
45-52 should be granted 




Motion to waive 
Budget Act 
rejected. 
On agreeing to the 
amendment. 
Motion to waive 
Budget Act 
rejected. 
The Sense of the Senate amendment, however, was 
essentially a powerless vote for moving forward item veto 
legislation. Because of this, the vote did not accurately 
convey the feelings of Senators, who may have voted in 
favor of the amendment for other reasons. Such was the 
case of Senator Robert C. Byrd(D) from West Virginia. Byrd 
who served as the Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman 
at the time of the vote, is one of the Senate's most ardent 
opponents of the line item veto. Angry over accusations 
that the deficit was the result of Appropriations Committee 
spending, Byrd stated that he used this vote to send "a 
shot across the bow to other committees, some of whose 
members [had] been joining in an assault on 
. t' ,,36 approprla 10ns. 
Still, the large number of bills and related hearings 
demonstrated the continued momentum of the measure. On 
April 11, 1989, hearings were held by the Senate 
Subcommi ttee on the Constitution to consider three i tem-
veto proposals (S.J. Res. 14, S.J. Res. 23, S.J. Res. 31). 
In 1994, the Senate's Constitution Subcommittee and Budget 
Committee held hearings on the subject. Within ten years 
36 Hager, George, 1993, "Byrd's Warning Shot," Coogressional Quarterly, (Mar 27), p. 733. 
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of Reagan's request, the number of hearings on the line 
item veto had matched that of the 100 years prior. 
Additionally, legislation signaling a shift in fiscal 
responsibili ty between the Congress and the President was 
having success in the House of Representatives. In 1992, a 
bill calling for expedited rescission authority for the 
President (H.R. 2164) passed overwhelmingly in the House. 
Then, over the next two years, two similar measures (H.R. 
1578 and H.R. 4600) passed the House. These measures would 
make it mandatory for Congress to vote on recommended 
rescissions by the President. Though the measures were 
substantially weaker than true item veto authority, they 
represented a maj or shift in opinion on the President's 
role in controlling spending. 
One of the most significant events that occurred 
during this period began with a column by Steven Glazier in 
the Wall Street Journal on December 4, 1987. In his 
article, Glazier contended that the Constitution already 
provided the President with item veto authority. To 
support his argument, he relied on Article 1, section 7, 
clause 3, which states in part, 
Every order, resolution, or vote to which the 
concurrence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
31 
question of adj ournment) shall be presented to 
the President of the United States ... 
Glazier argued that the only reason this clause was 
inserted into the Constitution was because the Framers, 
especially James Madison, wanted to keep future congresses 
from being able to "subvert the presidential veto by merely 
labeling its actions "'resolutions, votes, etc.' instead of 
'bills. ' ,,37 Congressional practices of attaching 
legislative riders to bills, as well as passing large 
bills, which include a variety of programs, are a means of 
subverting the presidential veto, he said. "This is the 
very game of form and name that inspired clause 3.,,38 
This argument immediately began to draw' supporters. 
Academics such as Forrest McDonald agreed that the clause 
was "designed to prevent the Congress from running amok, 
[and] to make responsibility lie in the presidency.,,39 
McDonald went on to say that one of the objections to the 
Constitution carried in Anti-Federalist tracts at the time, 
was that clause 3 "made too strong a line-item veto in the 
hands of the President.,,4o 
37 Glazier, Stephen, 1987, "Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto," Wall Street Journal, (Dec 4) p. 12. 
38 Ibid. 
39 McDonald, Forrest, "The Framers' Conception of the Veto Power," (1994 Constitution Subcommittee 
Hearings), p. 9. 
40 Ibid. 
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In 1988, administration officials reviewed the 
argument that President Reagan may already possess the line 
item veto. However, a Memorandum for the Attorney General, 
released in July of 1988 refuted the idea that the 
Consti tution provided such power to the President. The 
lengthy Memorandum focused on whether a 'Bill' must be 
limited in scope. 
If this term was intended to mean a legislative 
measure limited to one item of appropriation or 
to one subject, then it may be argued that the 
President properly may consider measures 
containing more than one such item or subject as 
more than one 'Bill' and, therefore, may approve 
or disapprove of each separately. . . Our review, 
however, of the relevant constitutional materials 
persuades us that there is no constitutional 
requirement that a 'Bill' must be limited to one 
b · t 41 su Jec • 
The Memorandum went on to refute both Glazier's and 
McDonald's arguments as well as others who supported their 
view. 
Supporters generally focused on Massachusetts and its 
State Constitution prior to the adoption of the u.S. 
Constitution, which served as the model for clause 3. The 
Massachusetts State Constitution used the term "revisal" to 
explain the Governor's actions upon receiving a bill from 
41 Cooper, Charles J., "Memorandum for the Attorney General," (1994 Constitutional Subcommittee 
Hearings), p. 123. 
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the Legislature. McDonald argued that this meant he could 
make changes as he thought necessary.42 
The Administration disputed the view, however. Citing 
that the term had two possible meanings at the time, it 
argued that the only one that made sense was to "simply 
review something." The Memorandum continued, saying that 
even accepting McDonald's contention, it still didn't 
provide the President with such power because the term was 
ultimately left out of the U.S. Constitution. 43 
Still, support for the idea grew in Congress and 
resulted in the introduction of legislation encouraging the 
President to exercise such a constitutional authority. 
Resolutions were introduced in the 101 st, 102nd , and 103 rd 
Congresses. One such resolution was S. Res. 245, 
introduced by Senator Specter in the 103 rd Congress, which 
encouraged the President to exercise the authority to 
determine its constitutionality. 
President Bush considered using the power, but only if 
he could identify a suitable case. While in a major battle 
with Congress over the budget, he gave the impression that 
he 'was considering whether to try it out on one of the 
fiscal year 1990 appropriations bills. 
42 Ibid., P 158. 
43 Ibid., p ] 59. 
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In an interview in 
1989, he stated, ~I'd like to test it the way it is. If I 
found the proper narrowly defined case, I'd like to try 
that and let the courts decide. ,,44 This led to increased 
concern among those in Congress who opposed the position. 
In the end though, President Bush never actually tested the 
issue. 
When the 103 rd Congress convened with a newly elected 
Democrat as President, passage of item veto legislation was 
still considered unlikely. Like Presidents Reagan and 
Bush, Clinton supported the item veto, having used it 
during his tenure as Governor of Arkansas. Some pundits had 
long argued that the typically Republican-backed 
legislation would not be desired if a Democrat was serving 
as President. This proved not to be the case however, as 
the number of proposals continued to increase, as did calls 
for the President to exercise the authority anyway, to test 
whether it was constitutional. 
Coincidentally, one notable and long-time opponent of 
the line item veto, Senator Bill Bradley (D) from New Jersey 
did switch his stance to support the issue in January of 
1993. Stating that he did so out of exasperation with the 
44 Calmes, Jackie, 1989, "A Bush Line-Item VetoT', Congressional Quarterly, (Oct 28) p. 2848. 
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budget deficit, the action moved him into the small 
minority of his party that supported the measure. 45 
By the second session of the 103 rd Congress, support 
for item veto legislation resulted in two separate hearings 
by the Senate. The Subcommittee on the Constitution and 
the Committee on the Budget heard testimony from a variety 
of witnesses. Arguments from all sides of the issue were 
presented, including consideration of whether the 
Constitution already provided the power to the President. 
The last of these two hearings was held in October of 
1994, just one month before a Republican majority would be 
elected in both Houses. With the election of the 
Republican majority, the item veto became increasingly 
likely. President Clinton would support legislation 
calling for the measure, and the Republican majority saw it 
as an important measure to control federal spending. In the 
House of Representatives Republicans the gave the line item 
veto top priority, placing it on a list of objectives they 
had entitled the "Contract with America." Wi thin a year, 
the line item veto would pass the House. Within two years 
it would be signed into law by President Clinton, closing 
the chapter on an issue that had begun 120 years before. 
4S Hager, George, 1993, "Bradley Bill Backs Line-Item Veto," Congressional Quarterly (Jan 16) p. 123. 
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:I:I:I. LEG:ISLAT:IVE H:ISTORY OF THE L:INE :ITEM VETO :IN 
THE l04th CONGRESS 
When the 104 th Congress convened on January 4, 1995, 
wi th a Republican maj ori ty in both houses, passage of the 
line item veto became a top priority. The House had placed 
the measure atop its list of legislative goals entitled the 
"Contract with America," giving it equal priority with the 
balanced budget amendment. l The Senate was similarly 
committed to increasing the President's power to cut 
wasteful spending. As part of its "Seven More in ' 94" 
platform, the line item veto was considered essential in 
concert with the balanced budget amendment. In the Senate, 
however, there were differing views over just how much 
power to give the President. This dispute, along with the 
failure of Congress and the President to agree on the 
fiscal year 1996 budget, ultimately put the line item 
veto's final passage in doubt. 
A. PASSAGE IN THE BOOSE 
One of the few issues the newly elected House 
Republicans and President Clinton could agree on was the 
need for a strong line item veto measure. House 
Republicans had settled for three weaker expedited 
I Hook, Janet, 1995, "Work Begins on GOP Agenda," Congressional Quarterly, (Jan 7), p. 9. 
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rescission proposals in years past, but now that the 
pendulum had swung fully in their favor they sought a true 
shift of budgetary powers. The vehicle they would use to 
provide this new power to the President was H. R. 2, the 
"Line Item Veto Act." On January 4th , H.R. 2 was introduced 
by Representatives Clinger(R), Blute(R), Neuman(R) and 
Parker(D) and was referred to both the Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight and the Committee on Rules. 
The new measure was very similar to the Solomon substitute 
to H.R. 4600, which had lost on a very close vote of 205-
218 in July of 1994. 2 
H. R. 2 was actually much stronger than a tradi tional 
line item veto. As reported in the House, the measure 
provided the President with the power to "rescind all or 
part of any discretionary budget authority." The President 
would not be limi ted to line items listed in an 
appropriations bill. Instead, he would be able to rescind 
specific programs which are normally only specified in 
report language that accompanies the bill. If the 
President was limited to striking items from an 
appropriations bill only, then Congress would still be able 
to shield questionable programs wi thin the lump-sum 
2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, Rept 104-11, Part 1, Jan 27, 1995, 
pp.4-5. 
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spending items of the bill. The President would be forced 
to veto the entire item just to get at the program to which 
he objected. 
Though titled a "Line Item Veto," H.R. 2 was actually 
an enhanced rescission measure. Long considered the 
strongest type of expanded rescission measure, it was also 
designed to avoid the need for a constitutional amendment. 
Under a traditional line item veto, the President would be 
able to veto specific items wi thin an appropriations bill 
when it was presented to him. The Congress could then 
overturn the President's vetoes with a two-thirds vote in 
each House. Such a measure would require a constitutional 
amendment, yet it would provide less flexibility to the 
President in vetoing those specific provisions to which he 
objected. Robert Reischauer described the limitations a 
line item veto would place on the President when he 
testified before a joint committee hearing on January 12, 
1995. 
For example, if a bill making appropriations to 
the State Department included (among others) a 
lump-sum appropriation of $20 billion for foreign 
aid, the item veto would give the President only 
two options: he could approve the whole $20 
billion or veto the item in its entirety. He 
could not reduce the amount to $15 billion, or 
39 
cut out only aid to a particular country, since 
the appropriation was not itemized that way.3 
The sponsors of H.R. 2 sought to provide considerable 
flexibili ty to the President while avoiding the difficult 
process of amending the Constitution. To accomplish this 
the bill would simply amend the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, by strengthening the 
President's already existing rescission powers. After 
signing the bill into law, the President would have ten 
calendar days (not including Sundays) to send a special 
message to Congress canceling the specific items to which 
he obj ected . If Congress failed to pass a "rescissions/ 
receipt disapproval bill" in twenty days to overturn the 
President's cancellations then the President's rescissions 
would remain in effect. The burden would now be on the 
Congress to act, which by itself represented a significant 
shift in power over the 1974 law. 
H. R. 2 also sought to provide the President with the 
power to cancel special interest tax benefits. These 
"targeted tax benefits" were originally limited to 
legislation aimed at reducing the tax burden for five or 
fewer beneficiaries. Following a mark-up in the Committee 
3 U.S. Congress, Joint Hearing before the Committee on Government Refonn and Oversight, House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senate, "Prepared Statement of Robert D. 
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on Government Reform and Oversight, that definition was 
expanded to include: 
Any provision of a revenue or reconciliation Act 
which the President determines would provide a 
Federal tax benefit to one hundred or fewer 
taxpayers. As defined by the bill, any 
partnership, limited tax benefit, trust or'S' 
corporation and any subsidiary or affiliate of 
the same parent corporation would be counted as a 
single beneficiary.4 
Prior to expanding the definition, Mr. Reischauer testified 
that the narrow provision could be easily avoided in a 
variety of ~ingenious" ways to keep a provision from being 
subj ect to the President's rescission. 5 The Cornrni ttee on 
Government Reform and Oversight's broader definition was 
meant to reduce the chance that special interest tax breaks 
could avoid the new measure. 
In making a cancellation, the President was to 
determine that it would reduce the Federal budget deficit; 
did not impair' any essential Government functions; and, 
would not harm the national interest. Ensuring these 
requirements were met, the President would transmit a 
special message to Congress within five days of the 
enactment of the pertinent bill into law. Transmission of 
Reischauer, Director, Congressional Budget Office," January 12, 1995, p. 64. (Hereafter, 1995 Joint 
Hearings). 
4 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Rept 104-
11, Part 2, Jan 30, 1995, p. 15. 
5 Reischauer, Robert D., 1995 Joint Hearings, p. 67. 
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the special message would include such items as the amount 
of budget authority rescinded; any account, department or 
establishment of the Government to which such budget 
authority was to be available for obligation, and the 
specific project involved; the reasons and justifications 
for rescinding the funds; and the estimated fiscal, 
economic, and budgetary effect of the rescission. 
The bill, as amended, was reported favorably out of 
the Committee on Rules on January 26, with a vote of 9-4. 6 
The amendments dealt mainly with the nature of information 
required for submission in a rescissions/ receipt 
disapproval bill, and the manner by which disapproval 
legislation would be considered in the House of 
Representatives. 
A dissenting view was filed by Representatives 
Moakley (0) , Beilenson (0) , Frost (0) , and Hall (0) which 
focused on the need to maintain a balance between 
"legislative proposals and their execution and 
implementation by the President.,,7 It was this conflict, 
they contended, that gave rise to the 1974 law, which was 
necessary to re-establish the balance which the Framers of 
the Constitution had intended. The Representatives 
6 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, Rept 104-11, Part 1, Jan 27,1995, p. 11. 
7 Ibid., p. 17. 
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believed H.R. 2 upset that balance and that a more 
responsible approach to increasing the President's power 
would be through an expedited rescissions measure. They 
had introduced such a substitute in the Committee on Rules, 
which failed by a vote of 4-9. 8 
In the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
H.R. 2 was amended to re-define targeted tax benefits and 
to ensure that rescissions enacted by the President would 
reduce the spending caps established under the Budget 
. Enforcement Act of 1990. The Committee also included a 
requirement for the General Accounting Office to report on 
all rescissions and targeted tax benefits "submitted 
through special messages" for each fiscal year.9 
The Committee passed H.R. 2 by a vote of 30-11, with 
all Republicans and six Democrats voting in favor of the 
bill. It was reported to the Committee on the Whole House 
on January 30th , and called up under an open rule, which 
passed by a voice vote on February 2nd • 10 The measure was 
debated on the floor of the House of Representatives on the 
3rd and 6th , during which only one amendment was agreed to. 
8 Ibid. 
9 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Rept 104: 
11, Part 2, Jan 30,1995, p. 2. 
10 Congressional Record, (Feb 2, 1995), p. H1086. 
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The amendment, offered by Representative Obey{D), sought to 
provide the President with the power to rescind items from 
the already passed fiscal year 1995 appropriations bills. 
Upon introducing the amendment, Representative 
explained his position regarding H.R. 2. 
What I am doing is trying to ensure that, if we 
are going to pass this misguided proposal, that 
at least we will be able to give the President 
the ability to reach any and all projects in the 
13 appropriation bills which passed last year. 1l 
Obey 
Though he ultimately voted against the legislation, 
Representative Obey wanted to ensure the President had the 
power to cancel unobligated budget authority listed in a 
packet called "Questionable Fiscal , 95 Projects by 
Subcommi ttee." His amendment passed the House by a voice 
vote on February 3 rd • 12 
As a birthday gift to Ronald Reagan, H.R. 2 passed in 
the House of Representa ti ves on February 6 th , by a vote of 
294 to 134. 13 It provided the President with broad 
flexibili ty to reach into appropriations bills and cancel 
specific provisions. This legislation would serve as the 
model for the final bill presented to the President in 
April of 1996. It would take the place of three different 
11 Ibid., (Feb 3, 1995), p. HII90. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., (Feb 3, 1995), p. HI264. 
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and controversial proposals in the Senate, passing as S. 4, 
after a long and difficult conference. Then it would serve 
as a sweetener to get conservatives in the House to agree 
to a debt limit increase, following one of the most 
disruptive battles over spending in the Nation's history. 
B. TWO APPROACHES IN THE SENATE 
Unlike Republicans in the House, Senate Republicans 
were divided over how much authority to provide the 
President. Similar to their experience in 1985, opposing 
groups wi thin the party threatened to keep the line item 
veto from ever passing. In that year, Senator Hatfield(R) 
had opposed the measure and successfully filibustered three 
cloture attempts by Senator Dole (R) . In 1995, the two 
Senators that took center stage on the issue were Senator 
John McCain (R) from Arizona and Senator Pete Domineci (R) 
from New Mexico. 
Senator McCain introduced S. 4, the "Legislative Line 
Item Veto Act," on January 4th , a bill that was very similar 
to H. R. 2 in the House. He explained that this was the 
same bill he had sponsored for the past eight years, and 
that it was needed because "Congress' addiction to pork had 
grown to obscene proportions."14 The need for such a strong 
14 Ibid., (Jan 4, 1995), p. 898. 
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item veto measure was rooted in his belief that Congress 
could not control its desire to spend money. Strong action 
by the President would be necessary to keep the Congress 
from spending beyond its limits. He continued: 
The disease that plagues us is our budget and 
spending habits. If we continue funding 
carelessly and recklessly; ignore budgetary 
constraints and economic realities-- if we 
continue to ignore this problem-- we risk our 
Nation's future. Mr. President, we must act 
to restore budgetary restraint in the congress. 15 
Senator Domenici's bill, S. 14, would provide the 
President with far less power to cancel budget authority. 
His measure would simply strengthen the President's role by 
giving him expedited rescission authority over 
discretionary spending and tax benefits. Under the 
proposal, Congress would be forced to vote to overturn the 
President's rescissions, but would need only a simple 
majority to do so. Both bills were referred jointly to the 
Commi t tee on the Budget and the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs with instructions that if one of the commi ttees 
reported the bill favorably then the other would have 30 
days to report the bill. Senator Domenici was Chairman of 
the Budget Committee, and as such had a great deal of 
influence over how each measure would be reported. Though 
he vehemently disagreed with Senator McCain's bill on the 
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grounds that it would give too much power to the President, 
he gave it equal consideration in the Budget Committee. 
On February 14, the Budget Committee held a markup 
session on S. 4. During the session, the measure was 
amended to include a "lock-box" mechanism requiring any 
savings derived from the President's rescissions to be used 
for deficit reduction. The amendment was agreed to by a 
voice vote. The committee then approved the bill along 
party lines on a vote of 12-10, with Senator Domenici 
voting in favor of the legislation. 16 
In additional remarks on the report, Domenici 
expressed his reservations to the bill, and stated that, 
ultimately, he would not support it without major changes. 
Quoting James Madison, he explained that the Congress must 
guard its constitutionally prescribed "power of the purse." 
Once the Congress delegated away its responsibility to the 
President, it would never get it back, he said. He 
concluded his remarks stating: 
IS Ibid. 
This is much more than an issue about wasteful 
spending, it is an issue of the appropriate 
balance of powers between the Congress and the 
President. I hope we can agree on an approach 
that gets a bill on the President's desk and 
signed into law without unduly disrupting this 
delicate balance of power. 17 
16 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Rept 104-9, Feb. 27, 1995, pp. 4-13. 
17 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
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Like Senator Domenici, Senator Exon (D) from Nebraska 
was concerned about the tremendous shift in power S. 4 
represented. Exon served as Ranking Member on the Budget 
Committee, and had originally been a co-sponsor of S. 14, 
which represented the limits to which most Democrats were 
willing to go to provide additional budgetary powers to the 
President. Wri ting the Minority Views on S. 4, Senator 
Exon stated that it "falls short of comprehensive and 
pragmatic line item veto legislation."ls 
Exon was deeply concerned with the requirement of a 
two-thirds majority to override the President's 
rescissions. In a passionate defense to keep the Senate 
from inflicting such "ideological purity" on itself and the 
American people, he argued many of his colleagues were: 
Concerned that the super-majority rule is a 
boomerang that could corne back and hit us when we 
least expect it. Under S. 4, the President needs 
a mere thirty-four percent of one House of 
Congress to rescind an appropriation that the 
Majority of Congress voted to approve. 
Therefore, S. 4 could unwittingly create a 
tyranny by the Minority. The Senate certainly 
does not need any further cause for gridlock. 19 
Senator Exon's views were echoed by a large number of 
Democrats, leaving considerable doubt as to whether 
supporters of S. 4 would have enough votes to invoke 
18 Ibid., p. ) 7. 
19 Ibid. 
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cloture. Most Democrats sought only to provide the 
President the type of expedited authority described in S. 
14. However, changes to that bill in a mark-up session 
weakened support from some key Democrats, like Exon, 
leaving final passage of any type of item veto legislation 
likely to falter on the Senate floor. 
The Budget Committee accepted a substitute for S. 14, 
which had some distinct differences from the original 
legislation. In the original bill, the President would 
have the power to rescind "any budget item. H That term was 
defined to mean, 1) An amount, in whole or in part, of 
budget authority provided in an appropriations act; 2) a 
targeted tax benefit; or, 3) an amount of direct spending. 
Of the House proposal (H. R. 2) and the two main Senate 
proposals (S. 4 and S. 14), this was the first to provide 
the President with the authority to rescind new entitlement 
spending. Additionally, targeted tax benefits were broadly 
defined as "any provision which has the practical effect of 
providing a benefit in the form of a different treatment to 
a particular taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers.H This 
language would give the President tremendous authority to 
deny special interest tax breaks, seen by many Democrats as 
an essential part of any expanded rescission measure. 
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The substitute had taken out each of these provisions 
and during the markup session amendments were offered to 
include them again. Senator Exon offered an amendment to 
make the legislation apply to targeted tax benefits which 
passed by a vote of 12-10. A later amendment was offered . 
to define targeted tax benefits along the lines of the H.R. 
2 definition, which applied to 100 or fewer beneficiaries. 
The amendment was agreed to by a vote of 12-10 again, but 
Senator Exon voted against it, stating that it would cause 
a "proliferation of new tax loopholes [which] is the last 
thing America needs. ,,20 Finally, language allowing the 
President to rescind new direct spending was left out of 
the bill. The committee reported it favorably on a vote of 
13-8, as amended and without recommendation, just as it had 
wi th S. 4. 21 
Both measures were reported out of the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, which held hearings on February 23, 
followed by a markup session on March 2. No amendments 
were made to S. 4, and it was reported without 
recommendation by voice vote. 22 S. 14 was amended slightly 
to preclude the President from canceling or reducing any 
20 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget, Rept 104-10, Feb 27, 1995, p. 23. 
21 Ibid., p. 18. 
22 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rept 104-13, Mar 7, 1993, p. 6. 
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budget authority for the Social Security Administration. 
The amendment was agreed to and the bill was reported 
without recommendation by a vote of 13-2. 23 
C. PASSAGE IN THE SENATE 
As both proposals moved to the floor, it became 
apparent that S. 4 would not be able to muster the 
necessary votes to override a filibuster by Democrats, who 
were overwhelmingly against the measure. Because 
Republicans held only a slim majority, Democrats would be 
able to stifle their attempts to bring S. 4 to a vote and 
could force a vote on S. 14, which they more generally 
favored. On March 7, when Senator Byrd(D) threw his 
support behind S. 14, Republicans realized that the battle 
for the stronger enhanced rescissions measure (S. 4) was 
lost. Having already failed to pass the Balanced Budget 
Am~ndment, the Majority Leader, Senator Bob Dole(R) now saw 
passage of another key Republican issue threatened. 24 
Once he realized the measure would fail, Senator Dole 
moved to end the division wi thin the Republican Party and 
encouraged McCain and Domenici to reach a compromise. The 
nature of the compromise took the form of a separate 
23 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rept 104-14, Mar 7, 1993, p. 6. 
24 Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "Faced with Impasse, GOP Offers Line-Item Veto Compromise," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Mar 11), p. 743. 
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enrollment measure similar to the one that had died to a 
filibuster in 1985. The bill would come to the floor as S. 
4, but would be an entirely different piece of legislation 
than the one that had passed in committee. On March 20, 
when the legislation was called to the Senate floor for 
debate, it was called as a substitute amendment in the 
nature of the separate enrollment compromise measure. 25 
Though the separate enrollment bill was subject to 
heated rhetoric from some Democrats due to its origination 
and lack of committee hearings, it drew relatively strong 
bipartisan support. Debate on the bill moved quickly, 
unlike the Balanced Budget Amendment, which had occupied 
the whole Senate for nearly the entire month of February.26 
On the 23 rd , when a roll call vote was ordered, the measure 
passed by a huge margin of 69-29, with Republicans voting 
50-2 in favor and Democrats voting 19-27 against. 27 
The success of the substitute measure can be 
attributed in part to President Clinton's support. Having 
called for the line item veto since his campaign, he added 
his influence during the Senate debate by calling on 
25 Congressional Record, (Mar 20, 1995). p. S4188. 
26 Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "Faced with Impasse, GOP Offers Line-Item Veto Compromise," Congressional 
Quarterly, (Mar 11), p. 743. 
27 Congressional Record, (Mar 23,1995), p. S4484. 
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Congress to pass the ~strongest possible line item veto."28 
To attract wavering Republicans and conservative Democrats, 
the drafters also included targeted tax breaks and new 
entitlement spending as legitimate targets for the 
President's item veto. 29 
According to the substitute for S. 4, every 
appropriation or authorization measure that passed both 
Houses of Congress would then be disaggregated and treated 
as a separate bill , with a distinct bill number. These 
smaller bills would then be voted on en bloc and would not 
be subject to amendment. After final passage in each 
House, the separate bills would be presented to the 
President. The President could then approve or disapprove 
each bill. Congress could overturn the President's veto 
with a two-thirds vote in each House. 
Despi te the support the legislation enj oyed, it was 
still seen by many Democrats as a cumbersome mechanism that 
could not possibly be instituted. Senator Byrd considered 
the tremendous task when he spoke against the measure on 
March 21st • 
The passage of a single appropriation bill by 
both Houses would be followed by a cut-and-paste 
28 Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "Line-Item Veto Compromise Easily Passes Senate," Congressional Quarterly, 
(Mar 25), p. 854. 
29 Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "GOP Reaches Pact on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Quarterly, (Mar 18), p. 
798. 
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operation in the office of the enrolling clerk of 
the originating body, and out of the wee hours of 
the night, the fructifying wet pen, the scissors 
and paste and the whiz of the computer of the 
enrolling clerk and his staff, would pour out a 
vast litter of mini-bills, or 'billettes,' not a 
single one of which had been passed by either 
body of Congress. 30 
Another major problem with the separate enrollment 
legislation was that it took away flexibility from 
executive branch agencies to reprogram funds within an 
appropriation. Under the new law, all the language 
specifying the purpose for which the funds were 
appropriated would be written directly into the bill, 
rather than in the report that accompanied the bill. Since 
this language would now be signed into law, the money would 
have to be spent according to the specific language in the 
bill. According to Senator Sam Nunn(D), Ranking Member on 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the inability to 
reprogram funds would be devastating to the Department of 
Defense. 
The Department of Defense routinely reprograms 
funds between various lines in the Appropriations 
Committee reports without any congressional 
invol vement. because there are certain 
programs that get behind schedule--they cannot be 
completed on time. Therefore, the money is not 
needed as originally anticipated. The money is 
needed somewhere else. 31 
30 Congressional Record, (Mar 21, 1995), p. S4227. 
31 Ibid., (Mar 22, 1995), p. S4343. 
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Realizing they lacked the votes to sustain a 
filibuster, the Democratic leadership instead offered 
several amendments to modify the final version of the bill. 
Senator Bradley (D) offered an amendment to redefine 
targeted tax breaks more broadly, which was voted down 50-
48. Senator Daschle (D) offered an expedited rescissions 
substitute, which was tabled on a vote of 62-38. Senator 
Byrd (D) offered an amendment to prevent any savings from 
the President's rescissions to be used for tax cuts, which 
failed when a point of order was raised against it. The 
point of order was sustained on a vote of 49-48. 32 
Each House had passed extremely different versions of 
expanded rescissions bills. Even as the Senate bill 
passed, Republicans in the House of Representatives were 
expressing their dislike for it. The Republican leadership 
now had the difficult task of drafting legislation that 
could be sent to the President. This task would become 
increasingly difficult, as the President and the Congress 
became entrenched in a bitter fight over the budget. These 
challenges would keep final passage of the line item veto 
from occurring for another year. 
32 Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "Line-Item Veto Compromise Easily Passes Senate," Congressional Quarterly, 
(Mar 25), pp. 856, 896. 
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D. LINE ITEM VETO AND THE BUDGET BATTLE 
As the political battle over balancing the budget 
heated up, Republicans became less eager to provide new 
powers to the President in the form of the line item veto. 
The Republican leadership's desire to balance the budget in 
seven years was attacked by Democrats and President 
Clinton, who sought a ten-year plan. This conflict led, in 
June, to President Clinton's first veto. During the first 
session of the 104 th Congress, ten more vetoes would follow 
as the budget battle pushed other legislation to the 
periphery.33 
Nei ther the Senate nor the House of Representatives 
moved quickly to conference. In an attempt to break the 
standstill, the House of Representatives called up the 
Senate bill (S. 4) on May 17. Stating the intent of the 
House leadership to move the measure "one step closer 
toward conference and long awaited enactment," 
Representative Bill Clinger (R) substituted S. 4 with the 
text from the House-passed bi 11 H. R. 2. 34 By substi tuting 
33 Kehoe, Mark T., 1996, "Clinton Veto Tally: Up to II," Congressional Quarterly, (Jan 6), p. 10. 
34 Congressional Record, (May 17, 1995), p. H5090. 
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the language of H.R. 2 into S. 4, the House was making the 
statement that the Senate-passed bill was unacceptable. 35 
By early June, President Clinton had become disquieted 
about the lack of progress on the line item veto. He used 
his veto of a rescissions and spending package (H.R. 1158) 
to jab at the Congress for their lack of progress on the 
measure. 
President Reagan was for it. President Bush was for 
it. The House passed it on President Reagan's 
birthday. They talked about what an urgent thing it 
was. Now they say they don't think they ought to give 
1. t to me this year because I might use it. . But 
I'll make them a deal: I f they'll send me the line-
item veto this year, I will not line-item any tax cuts 
they sign. I f they pass all these big tax cuts and 
wreck education and Medicare to cut taxes, I'll veto 
the whole thing. 36 
Concerns wi thin the Republican Party over President 
Clinton's possible use of the new measure had begun 
appearing in various news accounts as well. His comments 
helped put the spotlight on the stark differences between 
House and Senate proposals. The President's remarks were 
aimed at re-focusing the Republican leadership's attention 
on one of the few items of legislation that he and they 
mutually supported. 
35 Palmer, Elizabeth A., and Taylor, Andrew, 1995, "House Pushes Negotiations on Line-Item Veto," 
Congressional Ouarterly, (May 20), p. 1409. 
36 Clinton, William J., "Remarks by the President on Safe and Drug-Free Schools," Jun 7, 1995. 
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Meanwhile, Democrats in Congress continued levying 
charges of Republican foot-dragging. On June 20 th Senator 
Dole acted to get the process moving again by bringing the 
measure to the floor to appoint conferees. 37 However, a 
date for the conference was still not set. On August 1st , 
Senate Democrats pushed a sense-of-the-Senate resolution to 
the floor which urged the House of Representatives to 
appoint conferees. The measure was agreed to 83-14.38 
The Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich(R), continued 
to assert that the impasse could be resolved before the end 
of the year. He stated his plans to designate conferees 
following Congress' August recess. 39 On September 7th the 
House appointed its conferees, and passed a motion to 
instruct them to urge the Senate to adopt the House 
amendment to S. 4. 40 
The Conference committee met for the first time on 
September 27. After the meeting, conferees expressed the 
deep division between the two Houses. Representative 
Gerald Solomon (R) stated that "a quick melding of the two 
versions is virtually impossible. ,,41 Echoing his 
37 Congressional Record, (Jun 20, 1995) p. S8718. 
38 Taylor, Andrew, 1996, "GOP Renews Drive on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Ouarterly, (Aug 5), p. 
2346. 
39 Ibid . 
.. 0 Congressional Record, (Sep 7,1995), pp. H8605-8608. 
41 Freedman, Allan, 1995, "Major Disputes Face Conference on Line-Item Veto Measure," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Sep 30), p. 2978. 
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sentiments, Representative Clinger, the chairman of the 
conference, stated that he didn't think anything could 
realistically be accomplished before the middle of 
November. 42 
By their second meeting, Senate conferees had moved 
much closer to accepting the House version of the bill. 
While Republican senators moved slowly toward accepting the 
enhanced rescission framework, they insisted on a sunset 
provision. The issue was strongly opposed by House 
conferees. 43 
Though conferees hoped to finish their report before 
the end of the year, the prospects of that were fading. 
The budget battle between Congress and the President was 
pushing passage of the measure to the periphery. By 
December, when the President vetoed the Republican 
reconciliation bill, the push to pass the line item veto in 
1995 ended. Without another scheduled meeting of the 
conferees the line item veto was pushed into the second 
session. 
The budget battle continued well into 1996, with the 
Federal government operating on a series of continuing 
42 Ibid. 
43 Taylor, Andrew, (1995), "Senate May Give In on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Quarterly, (Nov II), 
p.3446. 
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resolutions. Conservative Republicans in the House were 
also threatening to vote down a must-pass debt limit 
increase package. The resulting uproar pushed 
consideration of the line item veto into March, when 
Senator Dole urged conferees to work out their differences. 
The compromise agreement was based largely upon the House-
passed enhanced rescissions bill. Senate conferees, 
however, received the sunset provision they had wanted. 
Addi tionally, the measure would apply to new or expanded 
enti tlement spending. 44 Official agreement was reached on 
March 21 st with a majority of conferees agreeing to the 
conference report (S. 4- H. Rept. 104-491) .45 
The Senate agreed to the conference report on March 
27 th , by a vote of 69-31.46 The House had originally 
intended to attach the measure to the $4.9 trillion dollar 
debt limit increase bill. UI timately the House leadership 
attached it to H.R. 391 which was the rule for H.R. 3136, 
the Senior Citizen's Right To Work Act of 1996. The rule 
stated that if the Senate agreed to the conference report 
on S. 4 by March 30 th , then it would be considered as passed 
44 Taylor, Andrew, (1996), "Republicans Break Logjam on Line-Item Veto Bill," Congressional Quarterly, 
(Mar 16), p. 687. 
45 Taylor, Andrew, (1996), "GOP Negotiators Agree on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Ouarterly, (Mar 
23), p. 779. 
46 Congressional Record, (Mar 27,1996), p. S2995. 
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in the House of Representatives. Wi th the passage of the 
rule, and upon notification from the Senate of final 
passage of S. 4, the measure was passed and subsequently 
separated from the rule, H.R. 391. The rule passed the 
House on March 28 th , by a vote of 232-177. 47 
President Clinton signed the Line Item Veto Act into 
law on April 9, 1996 as P.L. 104-130. At the signing 
ceremony, President Clinton praised the bipartisan effort 
that was necessary to pass the legislation. He went on to 
explain the importance of the measure in controlling 
spending. 
For years, presidents of both parties have 
pounded this very desk in frustration at having 
to sign necessary legislation that contained 
special interest boondoggles, tax loopholes and 
pure pork. The line item veto will give us a 
chance to change that, to permit presidents to 
better represent the public interest by cutting 
waste, protecting taxpayers and balancing the 
budget. 48 
From President Grant's call for the line item veto, 
until President Clinton signed the measure into law, 123 
years had passed. Though the measure could not be used 
until January 1, 1997, possibly after President Clinton's 
tenure had ended, he clearly enjoyed signing the measure 
into law. In doing so, he acknowledged all of the recent 
47 Congressional Record, (Mar 28, 1996), p. H2986. 
48 Clinton, William J., "Remarks by the President at Signing of Line Item Veto Bill," Apr 9, 1996. 
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presidents who had sought the measure. On Capitol Hill, 
the line item veto continued to draw fire from opponents 
such as Senator Robert Byrd. But for now, supporters 
enjoyed the accomplishment. 
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:IV. USE OF THE L:INE :ITEM VETO DUR:ING THE lOSth 
CONGRESS 
Following his reelection in 1996, Bill Clinton became 
the first President to exercise the Line Item Veto. In 
doing so, he discovered the limits inherent in its use. 
For example, each cancellation brought a corresponding 
reduction in discretionary spending limits. Because of 
this, the President had to consider the long-term affects 
of each cancellation on his spending priori ties. Also, 
each time he canceled an item he drew fire from congressmen 
of both parties, who saw their specific programs voided. 
Though in the final analysis his use of the Line Item Veto 
was limited, it influenced some long-time supporters to 
turn in opposition to the measure, while opponents reveled 
in the appearance that they had been right all along. 
A. PREPAR:ING TO OSE THE L:INE :ITEM VETO 
From the start of the 10Sth Congress, the Line Item 
Veto Act came under fire from opponents, led by Senator 
Robert Byrd, who sought to have the measure repealed in 
federal court. Though legal challenges to the Act will be 
fully discussed in the following chapter, it is important 
to realize the impact of lingering legal questions on the 
President's use of the measure. While the court challenge 
met with some initial success in Federal District Court, it 
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ul timately failed in mid-summer, when the Supreme Court 
ruled that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring 
suit against the act.l The justices' decision, however, did 
not answer the constitutional questions regarding the Act. 
As President Clinton considered using the Line Item 
veto, he had to contemplate whether his cancellations would 
ul tima tely be negated by the Supreme Court. Because of 
this, many of his advisors cautioned him to use the measure 
only on appropriations bills, which they determined placed 
. him 'on more solid legal ground. This was because the 
President's power to rescind budget authority was firmly 
established in u.S. history. Presidents had regularly used 
their role as Chief Executive to refuse or delay the 
spending of budget authority. The 1974 Budget Act was 
simply the last attempt to quantify that power, and the 
President's new enhanced rescission authority was rooted in 
that Act. 
In providing the power to cancel targeted tax 
benefits, however, the Line Item Veto Act was delegating a 
new power to President Clinton which had no precedent in 
u.S. history. Presidents had never been able to 
unilaterally change the tax code. Since canceling targeted 
I Supreme Court of the United States, Opinion of the Court, "William 1. Clinton, et aI, Appellants v. City of 
New York et aI," No. 97-1374, Jun 25, 1998, p. 1. 
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tax benefits was an entirely new grant of authority, the 
President's advisors felt it would be less likely to stand 
up to constitutional scrutiny.2 
This dilemma soon confronted President Clinton. On 
August 5th , he signed two budget reconciliation bills into 
law. The first was the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 
105-33); the second was the Taxpayer Relief Act (P.L. 105-
34) • The Balanced Budget Act included one limited tax 
benefit, while the Taxpayer Relief Act included 79 such 
benefits. 3 At a press conference the following day, 
President Clinton signaled his intention to review these 
special interest provisions carefully and, if necessary, to 
use the Line Item Veto on them. He first stated that he 
must clarify which items are legitimate targets for his 
i tern veto, and also that he would not veto any of those 
items which were part of the budget agreement. As for the 
rest he continued, "I will just go down and evaluate them 
and decide whether I think that they are sufficiently 
objectionable that they should be vetoed."4 
President Clinton was moving to use the Line Item Veto 
for the first time regardless of the legal consequences for 
2 Taylor, Andrew, and Rubin, Alissa 1., 1997, "Clinton Weighs Politics, History In Decision To Use Veto 
Power," Congressional Ouarterly, (Aug 9), p. 1917. 
3 Ibid., pp. 1915-1917. 
4 Clinton, William 1., "Press Conference by the President," The White House, Aug 6, 1997. 
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the Act. While doing 50 would draw broad public support, 
congressional reaction was uncertain. By August 8th , his 
staff had narrowed down the large number of provisions 
subject to the Line Item Veto considerably.5 
B. PRESIDENT CLINTON EXERCISES THE LINE ITEM VETO 
On August 11 th , President Clinton exercised the Line 
Item Veto for the first time in history on two provisions 
from the Taxpayer Relief Act and one provision from the 
Balanced Budget Act. From the Taxpayer Relief Act, the 
President canceled two limited tax benefits. The first 
cancellation, designated 97-1, was a provision that would 
have allowed various businesses to defer taxes on certain 
types of overseas income for up to one year. In cancel ing 
this provision the President stated that such an exemption 
would create "tax-haven abuses" and provide "preferential 
tax treatment to a limited group of taxpayers.,,6 
The President's second cancellation targeted a 
provision to allow the deferral of taxes on gains related 
to the sale of food processing equipment to certain 
farmers' cooperatives. The provision was intended to 
provide an exemption to a Texas businessman named Harold 
S Taylor, Andrew, and Rubin, Alissa 1., 1997, "Clinton Weighs Politics, History In Decision To Use Veto 
Power," Congressiona1 Ouarterly, (Aug 9), p. 1915, 1916. 
6 Message/rom the President o/the United States, "Cancellation of Limited Tax Benefit," House 
Document 105-116, Sep 3, 1997, p. 4. 
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Simmons. The exemption would allow Simmons to transfer 
food-processing facilities from his Almagamated Sugar 
Corporation to a cooperative of sugar-beet farmers called 
the Snake River Sugar Company.? Although President Clinton 
stated that he wanted to encourage "value-added" farming 
through similar arrangements, this particular item was 
being canceled for two specific reasons. 
First, the canceled item would have created 
opportuni ties for complete avoidance of tax on 
the gain from a sale of a refiner or processor 
because it lacks the safeguards that apply to 
sales of stock to [Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans] . Second, [it] failed to target its 
benefits to small-and-medium-size cooperatives. 8 
In addition to these two targeted tax breaks, 
President Clinton canceled one spending measure from the 
Balanced Budget Act. The State of New York had been in a 
long-running dispute with the federal government over 
matching funds for Medicaid services. Prior to 1991, 
several state governments levied taxes against health care 
providers for the purpose of increasing Medicaid matching 
funds from the federal government. The law was changed to 
require that, in order to be eligible for reimbursement, 
taxes must be "broad-based" and apply uniformly to all 
7 Weisman, Jonathan, 1997, "Vetoed Provisions-Farmers Co-Ops," Congressional Quarterly, (Aug 16), p. 
1954. 
8 Messagefrom the President o/the United States, "Cancellation of Limited Tax Benefit," House 
Document 105-116, Sep 3, 1997, p. 5. 
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providers. While New York claimed that its taxes met this 
definition, the Health Care Financing Administration, which 
administers Medicaid, disagreed and withheld those funds. 9 
In an effort to end the dispute, New York's Senators 
Alfonse O'Amato(R) and Patrick Moynihan (0) inserted a 
provision into the Balanced Budget Act which provided a 
waiver of the 1991 law. Under the waiver, any taxes, fees 
or assessments levied by New York would be eligible for 
reimbursement, provided they were enacted prior to June 1, 
1997. President Clinton vetoed this provision, stating it 
would establish "a costly precedent for other states to 
request comparable treatment. ,,10 
Congressional reaction to the President's vetoes 
varied considerably. Some congressmen felt that the 
President had simply asserted his prerogative. Others, who 
witnessed their specific provisions vetoed, suggested that 
the President had blind-sided them by singling out those 
provisions. Representative Charles Stenholm (0), who had 
fought for the food-processing tax-exemption, explained 
that he felt he had saved it from the President's veto 
9 Carey, Mary A, 1997, "Vetoed Provisions-New York Aid," Congressional Ouarterly, (Aug 16), p. 1955. 
10 Message from the President of the United States, "Cancellation of Item of New Direct Spending," House 
Document 105-115, Sep 3,1997, p. 4. 
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after speaking with him about the provision on August 10th.II 
As for the New York Medicaid provision, a spokesman for the 
House Commerce Committee disagreed with the President's 
view that it was not part of the budget agreement. He 
stated that the Administration had even made counter-
proposals on the issue. 12 
In the end, however, Congress did little to reverse 
the President's vetoes. While disapproval bills were 
introduced in both houses to override the cancellations, 
'prospects for overturning them were slim. Senator Moynihan 
introduced the first bill (5. 1144) on September 3 cd , to 
disapprove the cancellation of the New York Medicaid 
provision. Then on September 9t h, three more disapproval 
bills were introduced (H.R. 2444, S. 1157, H.R. 2436) in 
Congress. Each house had taken the procedural steps to 
disapprove the President's rescissions, but the bills would 
never move to a floor vote. 
The President's first use of the Line Item Veto had 
come on the heels of an in-house debate between his 
advisors over whether he should be cautious with the 
II Weisman, Jonathan, 1997, "Vetoed Provisions-Fanners Co-Ops," Congressional Quarterly, (Aug 16), p. 
1954. 
12 Carey, Mary A, 1997, "Vetoed Provisions-New York Aid," Congressional Ouarterly, (Aug 16), p. 1955. 
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measure or use it to send a strong signal to Congress. 13 
The President clearly opted for caution, striking only 2 of 
80 possible targeted tax benefits. Congressional reaction 
was limited to criticizing President Clinton for his 
choices, but there was no consensus among congressmen to 
overturn those cancellations. He had successfully avoided 
the rhetoric of partisanship by canceling provisions 
supported by members of his own party. The introduction of 
disapproval legislation proved as symbolic as President 
Clinton's limited use of the Line Item Veto. However, the 
ease with which he exercised his new authority would not 
extend to his next group of cancellations. 
C. CANCELLATIONS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT IN 1997 
President Clinton used his new authority to cancel a 
total of 82 provisions from 11 laws in 1997. Of those 
cancellations, 79 were spending measures within nine 
regular appropriations acts. The remaining cancellations 
came from the two reconciliation acts described in the 
previous section. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimated all canceled items to total $355 million in 1998 
outlays, and $937 million over five years. Table (4) 
provides budget authority and outlay amounts for each 
13 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "Clinton Finds New Veto Power Too Tempting To Postpone," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Aug 16), p. 1951. 
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cancellation between 1998 and 2002. Table (5) provides 
1998 budget authority, by app,ropriations act, as a 
percentage of overall discretionary spending. 14 
Cancellations by the President were insignificant 
compared to the overall size of the federal budget for 
1998. When viewed against overall discretionary budget 
authority, the President's cancellations were almost 
negligible, totaling only 0.09 percent. This is the 
appropriate comparison because while the Act allows the 
President to strike items of new direct spending, it does 
not give him the power to strike spending from previously 
enacted entitlements such as Social Security and Medicare 
which make up the fastest growing portions of the federal 
budget .15 
Entitlements and other mandatory spending currently 
encompass approximately two-thirds of all federal spending 
while discretionary spending makes up only the other one-
third. Since the Line Item Veto can not affect the amount 
of federal spending in these mandatory programs, there is 
Ii ttle value in measuring its impact on overall spending. 
Consequently, consideration of the impact of the Line Item 
14 Congressional Budget Office, 1998, "The Line Item Veto Act After One Year," CBO Memorandum, 
(April), pp. 11-14. 
IS Congressional Budget Office, 1997, "Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options," Report to 
the Senate and House Budget Comminees, (March), pp 211-213. 
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Veto on discretionary spending provides the best gauge of 
the effectiveness of the new measure. 
Tabl. (4) 
Cancellations Onder the Line Item Veto ActO 
Budget Amount Canceled 





Balanced Budget Act of 1997 BA 
o 
Military Construction 
Appropriations Act of 1998 
BA 
o 
42-55 Defense Appropriations Act BA 
o 
56 Treasury Appropriations Act BA 
o 
57-64 Energy and Water Act BA 
o 
65-71 Veterans, HUD Appropriations BA 
Act 0 
72-74 Transportation BA 
Appropriations 
Act 0 
75-76 Interior Appropriations Act BA 
o 
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2-3 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 REV 25 136 8 5 
56 Treasury Appropriations Act REV 4 35 37 37 
Total Tax/Revenue Cancellations REV 29 171 45 42 
All Cancellations 
Total Budgetary Effect b -355 -327 -125 -81 
Cancellations Overturned 
4-41 Military Construction BA 287 0 0 0 
Appropriations Act 0 28 102 79 46 
56 Treasury Appropriations Act BA -2 -12 -13 -13 
0 -2 -12 -13 -13 
Total Budgetary Effect Overturned b 30 125 103 70 
All Cancellations Except Those Overturned 
Net Budgetary Effect as of 3/31/98 b -325 -202 -22 -11 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 
NOTES: Numbers may not add up to totals because of rounding. 
BA: budget authority; 0: outlays; REV: revenues; 
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
a. Less than $500,000 











c. Amounts expressed in millions of dollars. Negative numbers indicate 
a decrease in the deficit or an increase in the surplus. 
The two bills that became the focus for most of the 
President's cancellations were the Military Construction 
Appropriations Act and the Defense Appropriations Act. Out 
of a total of 79 cancellations of discretionary budget 
authority, 52 came from these two bills. They also 
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accounted for $431 million out of $477 million in canceled 
discretionary budget authority for .the year.16 
Table (5) 
Cancellationa aa • Percentage of 
Total Discretionary Spending for rY9S 
Number of 




Commerce, State, Justice 
Defense 
District of Columbia 






















































NOTES: This table does not include actions overturning 
Cancellations 
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services; . 
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development. 















b. This cancellation (97-56) would increase on-budget direct spending 
and revenues (the revenue effects are not included). 
Of the nine regular appropriations acts, the only one 
that was significantly affected by the President's veto was 
the Military Construction Appropriations Act. Out of a 
total of $9.18 billion in budget authority, the President 
16 Ibid. 
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canceled $287 million, or just over 3 percent. 17 While this 
was still just a small fraction of military construction 
spending, it was significantly greater than the amounts 
canceled in any of the other eight effected appropriations 
acts. It also drew the most widespread outrage from 
Congress and resulted in the passage of the only 
disapproval bill. The only other cancellation overturned, 
prior to the Line Item Veto Act being ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, was a provision from 
the Treasury Appropriations Act. This provision, which 
deal t with the Federal Employees Retirement System, was 
overturned by the D.C. District Court in January of 1998. 18 
In total, President Clinton sent eleven special 
messages to Congress. Table (6) provides a brief 
description of each cancellation message. As a result of 
the President's cancellations, discretionary spending 
limits were reduced, over five years by $196 million in 
budget authority. Approximately seventy- five percent of 
the spending cap reductions were applied to defense 
discretionary spending. Table (7) provides a comparison 
between OMB and CBO estimates of adjustments to 
discretionary spending caps. 
17 Ibid., p. 14. 

















Special Messages in 1997 
Act 
Taxpayer Relief Act 
Balanced Budget Act 
Military Construction 
Appropriations Act 
Defense Appropriations Act 
Treasury Appropriations Act 
Energy and Water 
Appropriations Act 



































SOURCE: Congress10nal Budget Off1ce, Congress10nal Quarterly and 
computer-aided search of the Thomas website. 
The Line Item Veto provided a new dynamic in the 
budgeting process. While President Clinton's use of the 
measure was limited, his administration used the threat of 
cancellations to push their spending priori ties. Reports 
from private negotiations between administration officials 
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and congressional aides describe the veiled attempts for 
quid pro quo arrangements over spending priori ties. 19 One 
such example occurred on the Defense Appropriations Act, 
where the Clinton Administration sought funding for "dual-
use H technologies. Administration officials gave their 
proposal to Representative John P. Murtha (D) , who explained 
his interpretation of the Administration's tactics: 
It was very carefully handled so that there 
weren't any agreements made. It was just 
conversation, which made it look like things 
would be worked out if they got their money.20 
Negotiations such as this led an exasperated James Dyer, 
the staff director of the House Appropriations Committee, 
to exclaim, "I've said it 20 times: Don't come in here 
threatening me with the Line Item Veto. Just go use it. H21 
The overall success of these tactics is difficult to 
discern. One view may be that the limited use of the 
measure demonstrates that it proved an effective 
negotiating tool. There is, however, not currently enough 
information available to conclude this. It also becomes 
difficult to gauge due to a variety of factors that the 
President had to weigh prior to making a cancellation. 
19 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "With CR Done, Focus Now is on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Quarterly, 
(Oct 4), p. 2387. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 2388. 
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Each time President Clinton exercised the Line Item Veto, 
congressmen who lost specific programs complained that the 
Administration had misused the measure in some way. The 
President had to ensure that he ultimately maintained the 
support of Democratic congressmen, while not being viewed 
as overly partisan by Republicans. 
Table (7) 
Adjustments to Discretionary Spending Caps 
Due to Line Item Vetoes 
Adjustment Aaounts 
Agency Budget Category 1998 1998 2000 2001 
Defense Caps 
CBO Budget Authority -144 0 0 0 
Outlays -73 -49 -12 -4 
OMB Budget Authority -144 0 0 0 
Outlays -71 -50 -14 -5 
Nondefense Caps 
CBO Budget Authority -48 -1 -1 -1 
Outlays -27 -17 -2 -2 
OMB Budget Authority -49 -1 -1 -1 
Outlays -19 -22 -5 -4 
Total Discretionary Spendinq Cap Adjustments 
CBO Budget Authority -192 -1 -1 -1 
Outlays -100 -66 -14 -6 
OMB Budget Authority -193 -1 -1 -1 














SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office; Office of Management 
and Budget. 
NOTE: The adjustment amounts exclude cancellations 
nullified as of March 31, 1998. 
President Clinton also had to consider reductions in 
the spending caps, prior to making a cancellation. The 
~lockbox" mechanism, which prevented the President from re-
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directing budget authority to other programs, may have 
served as the most important factor in limiting his use of 
the Line Item Veto. Congress, which also sought to avoid 
reductions in the spending caps, had to consider the 
President's new authority, before sending him legislation. 
As a result, both the President and Congress were 
encouraged to compromise, if possible. 22 
One year does not provide sufficient experience to 
judge the extent of the shift in budgetary powers resulting 
from the Line I tern Veto Act. It is apparent that the 
measure introduced a new dynamic into the budgeting 
process, but to what extent it added power to the 
President's position relative to Congress is uncertain. 
According to the Congressional Budget Office, one of the 
new dynamics was the increase in importance of the 
President's budget submission. That dynamic is evident 
from the fact that the primary reason given for 
cancellations made by the President was that the item had 
not been requested in his budget. 23 
Limi ts on the extent of the shift in power to the 
President became evident early. The ability of Congress to 
22 Congressional Budget Office, 1998, "The Line Item Veto Act After One Year," CBO Memorandum, 
(April), 
ff· 24. 
Ibid., p. 26. 
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overturn cancellations in popular legislation placed the 
most direct limits on presidential authority. Congress 
used this authority to reverse 38 of the President's 82 
cancellations. To better understand the events associated 
with congressional reversal of the President's vetoes, 
these cancellations will now be considered in detail. 
D. TWO MZTBODS OF DISAPPROVAL 
Declaring that "the old rules have changed," President 
Clinton used the Line Item Veto on October 6th to cancel 38 
items from the Military Construction Appropriations Act 
(P.L. 105-45) .24 In his most significant use of the new 
measure, Clinton targeted programs that met three criteria. 
Franklin Raines discussed these criteria at a press 
conference following the President's veto. 
First, none of [the proj ects] were in the 
President's 1998 budget request for military 
construction. Second, we verified ... that the 
design work necessary to begin construction on 
these projects has not started. And, third, none 
of [the] projects on the list made a substantial 
contribution to the well-being and quality of 
life of men and women in the Armed Forces. 25 
This was the first of 13 regular appropriations acts 
for fiscal year 1998 to reach the President. Following 
conference, the bill passed in the House of Representatives 
24 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "Line-Item Boosters Reconsider As Clinton Vetoes Hit Home," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Oct 11), p. 2459. 
2S Raines, Franklin, "Press Briefing by Gene Sperling and Franklin Raines," The White House, Oct 6, 1997. 
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by a vote of 413-12. 26 It passed the Senate the next day by 
a vote of 97-3. 27 
The $9.18 billion spending measure was approximately 
$800 million more than the President had requested and 
contained some 129 projects not listed in his budget. 28 Due 
to its strong bipartisan support, many congressmen had 
doubted whether President Clinton would exercise the Line 
Item Veto on any significant portion of the measure. 
The President's decision to cancel proj ects from this 
popular measure had two immediate results. First, several 
congressmen who had voted in favor of the Line Item Veto 
Act withdrew their support for the measure. At a hastily 
convened meeting of the Senate Appropriations Committee to 
discuss the President's cancellations, Senators Larry 
Craig (R) from Idaho and Robert Bennett (R) announced their 
change of position. In withdrawing his support, Bennett 
stated, "I feel like I need to eat a little crow."29 
Several Democrats enjoyed the spectacle of Republicans 
backing down from their long-fought crusade; Senator Harry 
26 Congressional Record, (Sep 16, 1997), p. H7320. 
27 Congressional Record, (Sep 17, 1997), p. S9447. 
28 Greenblatt, Alan, 1997, "Military Construction Add-Ons Could Prompt Line-Item Veto," Congressional 
Quarterly, (Sep 20), p. 2239. 
29 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "Line-Item Boosters Reconsider As Clinton Vetoes Hit Home," Congressional 
Quarterly, (Oct 11), p. 2460. 
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Reid (D) acknowledged that "a part of me is gloating right 
now. ,,30 
The second result of President Clinton's cancellations 
was the wide spread outrage it drew from Congress. Since 
this appropriations act had benefited from such strong 
bipartisan support, both Democrats and Republicans shot 
back at the President for his cancellations. Many saw his 
cancellations as a direct assault on their responsibility 
to appropriate money. Senator Domenici(R) took issue with 
the President's suggestion that a program should be 
canceled if it had not been requested in his budget 
submission. 
The argument is presented that if the President 
puts a project in his budget, it is a good 
project because it is in his budget. It is, 
therefore, sanctified by a presidential budget. 
I am very concerned that no other projects can be 
thus sanctified if they are Congress' intent. 31 
The comrni ttee was in overwhelming agreement that the 
President's use of the measure challenged their 
constitutional prerogatives. Most Democrats used the 
hearing to air long held grievances against the Line Item 
Veto. Senator Dale Bumpers announced that if the Supreme 
30 Ibid. 
31 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Evaluate the President's Use of the Line Item Veto 
Authority for Military Construction; Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations, "Statement ofHon. Pete Domenici," 
Oct 9, 1997, p. 8. (Hereafter, 1998 Hearings). 
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Court sustained the measure, Congress' role would be 
reduced to such a degree that t~ey could "go home and 
receive [their] pay through the mail.,,32 Many Democrats, 
who echoed his view, saw the hearing as possibly a first 
step in repealing the measure. 
Other aspects of the President's established criteria 
for canceling these programs drew significant fire. 
Congressmen attacked the Administration's assertion that 
the lack of design work for these projects would keep them 
from being started in 1998. In his opening statement, 
Senator Byrd(D) argued that the committee had been informed 
"on each and every project" by the Department of Defense, 
that they were executable in 1998. After considering the 
established criteria in detail, Byrd concluded that the 
reason for each cancellation was "basically capricious and 
that there [was] only a flimsy rationale for [their] 
selection. ,,33 
During the hearing, the committee heard testimony from 
Major General Gill (USA), Major General Lupia (USAF) and 
Rear Admiral Ameraul t (USN). Their testimony confirmed 
Senator Byrd's statements, revealing that only two of the 
vetoed projects actually had no design work initiated, and 
32 Ibid., p. 12. 
33 Ibid., p. 3. 
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that the majority could be executed in fiscal year 1998. 34 
General Lupia also testified that some projects, such as a 
dining facility for Malmstrom Air Force Base, should have 
been considered quality of life projects. 
In some cases, the officers reported that erroneous 
information had previously been submitted to Congress or 
the Administration. One reason given for the error was the 
lack of clarification over just what was meant by 
"executable." General Gill stated that in his view, it 
meant whether a contract could be awarded, but the term was 
never clari fied. 35 
Congress reacted swiftly to the President's 
cancellations. Two bills, H.R. 2624 and H.R. 2631, were 
introduced in the House of Representa ti ves on October 7th • 
On October 9th , S. 1292 was introduced in the Senate. These 
bills intended to reverse all 38 cancellations. On 
November 8 t h, H.R. 2631 was debated on the floor of the 
House and passed by a vote of 352-64. 36 The Senate had 
passed S. 1292 on October 30, but later vitiated the 
action. It adopted H.R. 2631, which it passed on November 
9th , by a vote of 69-30. 37 
34 Ibid., pp.18-20. 
35 Ibid., p. 19. 
36 Congressional Record, (Nov 8, 1998), p. H10384. 
37 Ibid., p. S12414. 
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Congressional outrage had caused the Administration to 
change its position to some degree. Admi tting that they 
had made mistakes on some of the cancellations, Raines 
stated his commitment to "working with Congress to restore 
funding for those proj ects that were canceled as a result. 
of inaccuracies in the data provided by the DoD. ,,38 Their 
new position, however, did not mean they were willing to 
accept all 38 of the vetoed projects. Since the 
disapproval bill restored funding for all canceled 
projects, President Clinton vetoed the bill on November 
thirteenth. 
Congress adjourned sine die on November 13 th , so no 
further action was taken on the President's veto in the 
first session. Congress did not consider the measure again 
until February of 1998. On February 5th , the House of 
Representatives voted to override the President's veto by a 
vote of 347- 69. 39 The Senate considered the measure on 
February 25th , and by a vote of 78-20, voted to override the 
President's veto. 40 Though a significant period of time had 
passed, bipartisan support for the disapproval legislation 
had remained strong. 
38 Cassata, Donna, 1997, "President Uses a Delicate Touch in Vetoing Military Spending," Congressional 
Ouarterly, (Oct 18), p. 2557. 
39 Congressional Record, (Feb 5, 1998), p. H362. 
40 Ibid., (Feb 2S, 1998), p. SI000. 
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This marked the only time that disapproval legislation 
was passed to override a presiden~ial veto as defined in 
the Line Item Veto Act. The President's veto of the 
disapproval bill was also a first, as was the subsequent 
overturn of that veto. Together these events display the 
proper functioning of the Line Item Veto Act. Though the 
process took significantly longer than many had expected, 
it demonstrated clear limits on the President's ability to 
strike provisions from popular legislation. 
The Line Item Veto Act also provided for expedi ted 
consideration in federal court for anyone adversely 
affected by it. This was the claim made by the National 
Treasury Employees Union after President Clinton used the 
Line Item Veto to cancel a provision that would have 
allowed 1.1 million federal employees to swi tch from the 
Civil Retirement System to the Federal Employees Retirement 
System (FERS). 41 Commonly referred to as the "FERS open 
season" provision, it was the single item canceled from the 
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act (P. L. 
105-61), which the President signed into law on October 
41 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "Opponents of Line-Item Veto Try Again for Redress in Court," Congressional 
Quarterly, (Oct 18), p. 2543. 
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Remarking on the cancellation, President Clinton 
stated that it would "save $854 million over five years by 
preventing a hastily-conceived, undebated provision from 
becoming law."42 Senator Stevens(R) had added the provision 
to the bill during conference and so debate on it was 
severely limited. According to the President, the 
provision would result in higher spending levels for 
government agencies, by forcing them to fund higher cost 
retirement programs for those individuals who switched to 
FERS. At the same time, these agencies would lose revenue 
to fund retirement programs, since individuals who switched 
to FERS would no longer be contributing to the Civil 
Retirement System. 
President Clinton listed the provision as an item of 
discretionary spending in his cancellation message. 
However, the Line Item Veto Act does not allow for the 
classification of reduced revenues as an item of 
discretionary spending. According to the Act, receipts can 
only be canceled if they qualify as limited tax benefits. 
This distinction became the basis of the NTEU's legal 
challenge. The Union filed suit immediately, arguing that 
42 Clinton, William J., "Statement by the President," The White House, Oct 16, 1997. 
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the President had overstepped his authority by cancel ing 
the provision. 43 
The Department of Justice agreed to a settlement with 
NTEU in December. In accordance with the settlement, Judge 
Thomas Hogan issued an order nullifying the President's 
cancellations on January 6th , 1998. His order stated that 
the President \\ lacked authori ty under the Line I tern Veto 
Act" to cancel the provision. 44 
These two methods of disapproval helped define the 
limits of the President's new authority. The vagaries 
within the law were being worked out either in federal 
court or in Congress. The President's attempts to overturn 
legislation that he disagreed with were clearly limited by 
Congress in this first year. Because of congressional 
passage of disapproval legislation and review in federal 
court, nearly half (39 out of 82) of the President's 
cancellations were overturned. Still, even some supporters 
of the Line Item Veto were having second thoughts about the 
Act. 
Two more court cases were being considered by Judge 
Hogan that would ultimately make the Line Item Veto Act 





unconstitutional. The cases would finally overcome the 
greatest hurdle that opponents of the Act had faced: 
proving they had legal standing to sue. Even though the 
Supreme Court would not consider the case until mid-summer, 
the President would not have another occasion to exercise 
his new power. 
89 
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v. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT 
Eager to reverse what he had failed to stop in 
Congress, Senator Byrd, along with five other congressmen, 
filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia one day after the Line Item Veto Act became 
effective. In accordance with language in the Act, which 
provided for expedited consideration in federal court to 
test its constitutionality, Byrd filed his case arguing 
that the Act violated the Presentment Clause of the 
Constitution. 
In total, four cases would be brought against the Act 
before it was ultimately ruled unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court. Each case would be subj ected to rigorous 
scrutiny over whether the plaintiffs had legal standing to 
sue. Once standing was established, the justices would 
rule against the Act, stating that Congress does not have 
the authority to delegate such sweeping new power to the 
President. Though a few ardent supporters would vow to 
pass a new law, the Court's ruling brought to a close this 
important chapter in the history of the Line Item Veto. 
A. EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE ACT 
When the National Treasury Employees Union filed suit 
over the President's cancellation of the FERS open season 
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provision, it also sought to have the Line Item Veto Act 
declared unconstitutional. As previously discussed, Judge 
Hogan's ruling on January 6, 1998, upheld an earlier 
agreement between the NTEU and the Department of Justice. 
Having ruled that the President did not have authority to 
cancel the provision, Judge Hogan dismissed the part of the 
NTEU's suit which contended that the Act was 
unconstitutional. This was the second of two such rulings 
in federal court where opponents would fail to prove they 
had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. 
The first began on January 2, 1997, when six members 
of Congress, led by Senator Robert Byrd, filed suit for 
declaratory judgement against the Act claiming that it 
violated Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. The 
Act, they alleged, violated the requirement for bicameral 
passage of legislation by providing the President with the 
authority to unilaterally repeal provisions of federal law. 1 
The congressmen claimed that they were "directly and 
concretely [injured] ... in their official capacities," 
because the Act, 
Alter [ed] the legal and practical effect of all 
votes they may cast on bills containing such 
separately vetoable items; divests [them] of 
their constitutional role to repeal legislation; 
1 Rehnquist, C. J., Chief Justice of the United States, Raines v. Byrd, ''Opinion of the Court," Supreme 




the constitutional balance of 
The basis for this claim was that the Act had an 
immediate detrimental effect on their constitutionally 
prescribed powers by changing the nature of negotiations on 
future legislation. Prior to its passage "Members could 
reach compromises with each other on spending and tax 
bills. .. because every Member had assurance that a bill 
could take effect only in the agreed upon form.,,3 With 
passage of the Line Item Veto Act, the President now had 
the power to breach those compromises by his unilateral 
action. The President's ability to "re-shape" legislation 
changed the legal effect of their votes. Under the Line 
Item Veto Act, passage of legislation simply provided the 
President with a menu of different alternatives to chose 
from, thus injuring them "whenever a bill [came] up for a 
vote.,,4 
The Administration challenged the congressmen on the 
procedural issue of legal standing. It asserted that the 
consti tutional challenge presented by the congressmen 
should be dismissed because it was not "ripe." They had 
not been injured by the Act, and therefore lacked standing 
2 Ibid. 
3 Supreme Court of the United States, Raines v. Byrd, "Brieffor Appellees," May 9, 1997, p. 6 . 
.. Ibid. 
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to sue. Claiming that the appellees had only a 
"generalized" and "speculative" grievance against the Act, 
the Administration stated that they could not prove a 
"judicially cognizable private interest" had been injured. 5 
Any claimed injury to their constitutional powers failed to 
meet this requirement and, thus, the appellees could not 
prove they had standing as required under Article III of 
the Constitution. 6 
On April 10th , District Court Judge Thomas Jackson 
delivered his opinion. Judge Jackson found that the 
appellees did indeed have standing to bring sui t under 
standards set by the D.C. Court of Appeals. The appellees 
claim that the Act "dilute[d] their Article I voting power" 
was enough to confer Article III standing. 7 The appellees' 
perception that the Act adversely affected them by changing 
the meaning of their votes was enough to prove they were 
injured by the Act. B 
In a strong statement, Judge Jackson struck down the 
Line Item Veto Act. "The power to 'make' the laws of the 
nation is the exclusive, nondelegable power of Congress," 
S Supreme Court of the United States, Raines v. Byrd, "Rep1y Brief for Appellees," May 21, 1997, p. 1. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Rehnquist, C. 1., Chief Justice of the United States, Raines v. Byrd, "Opinion of the Court," Supreme 
Court of the United States, Jun 26, 1997. 
8 Ibid. 
94 
he said. 9 The Act was unconstitutional because it 
"effectively permitt[ed] the President to repeal duly 
enacted provisions of Federal law. ,,10 In delegating such 
power to the President, Congress risked upsetting the 
constitutionally prescribed balance between the branches of 
government. 
Jackson had issued the first defeat to the Line Item 
Veto Act. Opponents of the legislation were obviously 
happy about the decision, Senator Byrd calling it a "great 
day for the Constitution and the American people. ,,11 
However, the Administration made clear its intention to 
appeal Jackson's ruling. In a statement afterward, 
President Clinton called the Line Item Veto an important 
tool "in helping preserve the integrity of Federal 
spending," and said "we have to appeal it.,,12 
The Supreme Court heard the appeal on an expedi ted 
schedule. On May 27, 1997, the Court heard formal 
arguments. On June 26 th , the justices dismissed the case, 
disagreeing with Judge Jackson's contention that the 
appellees had standing. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered 
the opinion of the Court. Citing Moore v. U.S. House of 





Representatives, and refuting the precedent cited by Judge 
Jackson, Justice Rehnquist stated, "The Supreme Court has 
never endorsed the Court of Appeals analysis of standing.,,13 
To prove standing, Justice Rehnquist continued, the 
congressmen must prove personal injury because of the Act, 
rather than injury to their official capacity. The claim 
brought by the congressmen was that the nature of their 
votes was adversely affected by the Act. Such a claim 
focused only on their official capacities. "If one of the 
members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a 
claim," Justice Rehnquist concluded. 14 Thus, precedent did 
not support the congressmen's claim. 
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, neither legal 
precedent nor historical practice supported the plaintiffs. 
Whenever there had been disputes between Congress and the 
President in the past, "no suit was brought on the basis of 
claimed injury to official authority. ,,1S To show this, 
Justice Rehnquist used the Tenure of Office Act which 
passed over President Andrew Johnson's veto in 1867. 
Justice Rehnquist stated that Johnson had had a much 
stronger claim of injury than did the current plaintiffs. 
13 Rehnquist, C. J., Chief Justice of the United States, Raines v. Byrd, "Opinion of the Court," Supreme 




According to the Tenure of Office Act, the President 
had to get approval from the Senate before dismissing any 
appointee whose appointment had required the approval of 
the Senate. When Johnson dismissed his Secretary of War 
without the consent of the Senate, the House of 
Representatives began impeachment proceedings against 
Johnson. Johnson's official capacities were clearly 
injured by the Tenure of Office Act, but if the federal 
courts adjudicated the matter, 
and unnecessarily plunged 
battle. ,,16 
they would have "improperly 
into [a] bitter political 
Having concluded that legal precedent and historical 
practice failed to support the plaintiffs, the Supreme 
Court vacated the ruling of Judge Jackson and dismissed the 
case. Wi th the ruling, the consti tutionali ty of the Line 
Item Veto Act was not considered. Once again it was 
dismissed only on the grounds of standing without 
consideration of its constitutional merits. It would take 
the President's exercising of the Act, from which an 
individual could claim personal injury, before the justices 
would consider that the plaintiff's had the necessary 
standing to sue. 
16 Ibid. 97 
B. LINE ITEM VETO ACT RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The President's cancellation of a targeted tax benefit 
to allow an exemption of taxes on gains from the sale of 
food-processing equipment to the Snake River Potato Growers 
provided the type of personal injury required for Article 
I I I standing. His cancellation of the New York Medicaid 
spending measure provided another example of personal 
injury. The parties claiming injury from these two Line 
Item Veto cancellations filed suit in D.C. District Court 
for declaratory judgement against the Line Item Veto Act. 
The two cases were combined and heard by Judge Thomas Hogan 
on January 14, 1998. 
Judge Hogan ruled that, based on the requirements set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd, both the City 
of New York and the Snake River plaintiffs had standing to 
sue. The Snake River growers had suffered at least one 
injury from the Act. The injury resulted when the Idaho 
Potato Packers (IPP) called off negotiations over the sale 
of a potato processing facility due to President Clinton's 
cancellation of an item from the Taxpayer Relief Act. The 
IPP withdrew from these negotiations because it would no 
longer be able to defer taxes on gains resul ting from the 
98 
sale. 1? Likewise, the City of New York was immediately 
injured when the President canceled the provision from the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which was to eliminate its 
financial liability under federal law. President Clinton's 
cancellation renewed that financial liability, thus 
providing concrete injury to hospitals and associations 
within the City of New York. 1s 
After ruling on the issue of standing, Judge Hogan 
declared that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional 
because it "viol at [ed] the procedural requirements ordained 
in Article I of the Constitution. ,,19 The Act, he said, 
viola ted the requirement for "bicameral passage and 
presentment [of legislation] to the President. ,,20 It also 
disrupted the balance of powers between the branches of 
government. Calling it an "abandonment of lawmaking 
power," Judge Hogan went on to say that it, 
Impermissibly crosses the line between acceptable 
delegations of rulemaking authority and [is an] 
unauthorized surrender to the President of an 
inherently legislative function, namely, the 
authori ty to permanently shape laws and package 
1 . 1 t' 21 egls a lon. 
17 Hogan, Thomas F., City of New York v. William J. Clinton, Snake River Potato Growers Inc., v. Robert 
E. Rubin, "Memorandum Opinion," U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Feb 12, 1998. 
18 Ibid. 




The Administration appealed Judge Hogan's ruling to 
the Supreme Court. The Court heard the appeal on an 
expedited schedule, with arguments commencing on April 27, 
1998 and issued its ruling on June 25
th
• 22 The Court upheld 
Judge Hogan's interpretation of legal standing as well as 
his judgment that the Line Item Veto Act was 
unconstitutional. In a lengthy ruling, the Court declared 
that the Act did, indeed, violate the Presentment Clause of 
the Constitution. Citing, among other cases, INS v. 
Chadha, the Court ruled that, 
The Article I procedures governing statutory 
enactment were the product of the great debates 
and compromises that produced the Constitution 
itself. Familiar historical materials 'provide 
abundant support for the conclusion that the 
power to enact statutes may only "be exercised in 
accord with a single, finely wrought and 
exhaustively considered, procedure."23 
The Act profoundly changed the method by which laws 
were enacted. It gave the President the power to 
fundamentally alter legislation, which had been thoroughly 
debated in Congress. If the President could determine 
which cancellations to make within just five days, he could 
essentially enact a new piece of legislation that bypassed 
the exhaustive process the Framers had put into place. 
22 Supreme Court o/the United States, Clinton v. City of New York, "Syllabus," Supreme Court of the 
United States, Jun 25, 1998, p. 1. 
23 Ibid., p. 3. 
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This was, according to the Court, beyond the President's 
power as provided in the Constitution. 
Justice Stevens, who wrote the Opinion of the Court, 
provided a lengthy assessment of why the Line Item Veto Act 
violated the Constitution. In describing the President's 
powers to sign legislation into law, he focused on what the 
Constitution allowed the President to do, and how those 
procedures were upset by the Act. The Constitution, he 
said, gives the President power to return legislation to 
Congress prior to its enactment into law, but not after. 
It is "silent on the subject of unilateral presidential 
action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted 
statutes. ,,24 
According to Justice Stevens, the President's 
cancellations had the "practical effect" of amending two 
pieces of legislation by "repealing a portion of each." 
Again quoting the Chadha case, Stevens stated that the 
"[R]epeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform 
wi th Article I. ,,25 
There is no provision in the Constitution that 
authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or 
to repeal statutes. Both Article I and Article II 
assign responsibilities to the President that 
directly relate to the lawmaking process, but 
24 Stevens, J., Clinton v. City of New York, "Opinion of the Court," Supreme Court of the United States, 
Jun 25, 1998, p. 21. 
2S Ibid., p. 19. 
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neither addresses the issue presented by these 
cases.
26 
Upon issuing its ruling, the Court emphasized three 
points. First, the justices expressed no opinion about the 
utili ty of the Act. Second, they did not consider Judge 
Hogan's contention that the Act disrupted the balance of 
powers between the branches of government. And third, the 
justices focused only on the narrow question of whether or 
not the Act was constitutional. 27 
C. CONCLUSION 
After several attempts, the Supreme Court had at last 
ruled on the Act's constitutionality. Robert Byrd and 
others celebrated their final victory over what he had once 
referred to as an "abomination" and "horror."2B Meanwhile, 
some ardent supporters introduced new legislation on the 
same day as the Supreme Court's ruling that they hope can 
pass constitutional muster. At least four bills were 
introduced (H.J. Res. 124, S. 2220, S. 2221, and H.R. 4174) 
which intend to provide the President authority similar to 
the Line Item Veto Act. Only one of the four seeks to 
provide that power by constitutional amendment; the other 
26 Ibid. 
27 Supreme Court of the United States, Clinton v. City of New York, "Syllabus," Supreme Court of the 
United States, Joo 25, 1998, pp. 3,4. 
28 1998 Hearings, p. 4. 
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three provide it by statutory means. However, any movement 
toward passage of these bills for the immediate future 
seems unlikely. 
With the Act rendered unconstitutional, it remained to 
determine how to treat the canceled proj ects. Including . 
the Snake River and New York lawsuits, 43 cancellations had 
now been voided by the Supreme Court. These cancellations 
represented $569 million in scheduled outlays or losses in 
revenue over five years. Many individuals wanted to know 
if these funds would be released immediately or if 
indi viduals would have to request them from the Office of 
Management and Budget. The Clinton Administration 
considered what to do with the funds for several weeks, 
until July 17th , when OMB announced all funds from canceled 
provisions would be released immediately.29 
The Line Item Veto Act had failed to withstand the 
scrutiny of the high Court. Wi th its demise, there was 
little outcry from congressmen. During the short, 
controversial and unhappy life of the Act, many of its 
supporters had become opponents . Practical experience with 
• This number is detennined by summing the amounts listed on the final line of Table (4) in Chapter IV. 
The amounts represent the net budgetary effect after passage of the Military Construction Disapproval Bill 
and Judge Hogan's ruling, which overturned the FERS open season provision in the Treasury 
Appropriations Act. 
29 Business and Society "Clinton Gives Up on Line Item Veto Fight," 1998, Corigressional Ouarterly, (Jul 
18), p. 1956. 
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the measure had left all but the most devout deficit-hawks 
leery of new legislation to revive it. Whether there will 
be a push for expedited or enhanced rescission authority in 
future congresses remains unknown. For now, though, the 
Line Item Veto will be remembered as a short-lived 
experiment that did not last long enough to demonstrate its 
value. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Among major legislative issues, the Line Item Veto is 
unique in many ways. For example, one hundred and twenty-
four years passed between President Grant's initial call 
for the measure and President Clinton's signing the Line 
Item Veto Act into law. Yet, within one year of the 
President's first Line Item Veto cancellation the Act was 
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Supporters 
had long realized that a constitutional amendment would be 
required to provide enhanced powers to the President. But 
in well over one hundred years, support for such an 
amendment had failed to materialize. 
Realizing they had no chance of ratifying a 
constitutional amendment, supporters sought to enhance the 
President's power by statutory means. This required some 
circumventing of the Constitution. To accomplish this, 
supporters based the new law on the President's power to 
rescind funds as established in the Congressional Budget 
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. By simply enhancing 
these powers, they believed, the Line Item Veto Act would 




Because the measure was only in effect for one year, 
it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the shift in 
budgetary powers from Congress to the President. While the 
mechanics of the measure appeared to favor the President in 
disputes over spending priori ties wi th Congress, 1997 saw 
relatively little in the way of heated budget battles, 
providing scant evidence for speculation. 
This chapter will briefly re-examine the issues of 
this thesis to determine what the political and fiscal 




Item Veto have 
Act, and some 
been. 
general 
Based on the 
views about 
congressional motives (i. e., congressmen attempt to pass 
legislation favorable to their constituents), the chapter 
will explore congressional reaction to President Clinton's 
cancellations. This will aid in understanding the 
political impact of the measure. Finally, the thesis will 
compare President Clinton's use of rescissions to his use 
of the Line Item Veto to help determine the new measure's 
impact on the budgeting process. 
A. POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE LINE ITEM VETO 
Accurately determining the political and fiscal impact 
of the Line Item Veto is difficult because we are confined 
to the experiences of a single year. During that year, one 
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political effect occurred that may not have been 
anticipated. After witnessing the President cancel items 
from a popular piece of legislation, many supporters of the 
Line Item Veto turned in opposition to it. Some 
Republicans began to view passage of the Act as a mistake 
and spoke out against the measure. Democrats, who had long 
opposed the Act, welcomed this change in position. In 
October, Senator Robert Byrd(D) and Representative David 
Skaggs (D) introduced a total of three bills to repeal the 
Line Item Veto Act; however, none of them were reported out 
of committee. 1 
The reaction described above is not meant to suggest 
that the Line Item Veto was used in a partisan manner. The 
most significant dispute surrounding its use occurred when 
the President canceled 38 projects from the Military 
construction (MiICon) Appropriations Act. Congressional 
reaction to these cancellations centered on inaccuracies in 
cri teria the President cited in making cancellations, as 
well as the view from members that he was intruding on 
their political responsibilities. 
The MilCon bill had drawn widespread support from both 
political parties. Both Democrats and Republicans in 
I Congressional Record, (Oct 9,1997), p. H9045; (Oct 25,1997), p. SI1117. 
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Congress saw President Clinton's cancellations from that 
measure as an attack on their prerogatives. Opponents and 
supporters alike rallied behind the disapproval legislation 
to defend their individual priori ties against this attack 
from the Executive. 
Republicans did not view the President's cancellations 
as partisan. Indeed, throughout 1997 President Clinton's 
cancellations went across party lines. The limited use of 
the measure, which will be considered later, also helped to 
mute charges of partisanship. It also minimized 
suggestions that Congress' power relative to the President 
had been severely diminished. In fact, concerns that the 
Line Item Veto could provide the President with an ability 
to push through a partisan agenda came from members of his 
own party. Republicans had, after all, fought hard to 
provide him with this enhanced power. 
Rather than using the measure for partisan advantage, 
the President used it as a bargaining tool to ensure that 
his priorities were left in the budget. He also used it to 
cancel items that he determined were unnecessary and 
wasteful. 
The MilCon bill was unique because the President's 
Line Item Veto cancellations caused such a determined 
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response from members of Congress. As a result of his 
cancellations on this legislatio~, Congress drafted the 
only disapproval bill to be reported out of committee. 
From there it went on to pass both houses of Congress and 
then became law over a presidential veto. The sustained 
and unified congressional support for this disapproval bill 
was mainly due to members' concerns that the President was 
infringing on their political prerogatives. 
The Military Construction Appropriations Act was not 
the only bill to be subject to disapproval legislation. As 
mentioned in Chapter IV, cancellations from the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 and Taxpayer Relief Act also resulted in 
the introduction of disapproval bills. However, the bills 
attracted little support and were never reported out of 
committee. Possible reasons for the lack of congressional 
interest were that the cancellations were not viewed as 
infringing on congressional prerogatives and that they were 
relatively minor. 
A review of the President's cancellations and 
congressional response to them reveals that the Line Item 
Veto Act functioned as it was intended. When Congress felt 
strongly enough, it was able to overturn the President's 
cancellations. However, when those cancellations failed to 
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stir congressional interest, they were allowed to stand. 
This was indeed what the framers of the Act had intended. 
The other dynamic that was seen during this first year 
was the importance of the President's budget submission. 
As stated earlier, the primary reason given by President 
Clinton for canceling an item of spending was that it had 
not been requested in his budget. The President can use 
the Act to re-shape legislation to resemble what he had 
previously requested, as long as his priorities are already 
written into the bill. The Act, therefore, modified the 
President's position in bargaining with Congress. No 
longer did they have to reach agreement on the entire bill. 
As long as his priorities were written into the bill, he 
could re-shape the rest of the legislation in a way that 
best suited his judgement. 
However, this did not provide carte blanche authority 
for the President to re-shape legislation. In the case of 
a president who was unwilling to compromise, Congress 
maintained some ability to strengthen its position. For 
example, since the Act was passed by statute rather than 
constitutional amendment, Congress could conceivably exempt 
items from the President's veto. Shielding items from the 
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President would prompt him to either sign or veto the 
legislation in its entirety. 
Congress ultimately drafts legislation based on the 
desires of the President and its own constituents. If the 
President threatened to cancel items that were important to 
Congress, Congress could respond with legislation that 
omitted presidential spending priorities. Since the 
President was unable to add to legislation a strong 
Congress could take this position and challenge the 
President to veto the legislation. 
The strict limits within the Act establishing how the 
Line Item Veto could be used also aided Congress' position 
vis-a-vis the President. When the President overstepped 
those bounds by canceling the FERS open season provision, 
the federal courts responded by declaring it beyond the 
President's power. Also significant was the lock-box 
mechanism, which kept the President from re-directing funds 
to his spending priorities. 
The threat to the relative bargaining positions 
between Congress and the President was a major concern for 
opponents of the measure such as Senator Byrd. Not only 
did they claim that the relative importance of their votes 
had changed, but they also worried that the Line Item Veto 
III 
could be used for partisan advantage. It is noteworthy 
that this argument came from members of the President's own 
party. Though no such example occurred during the Act's 
short period of enactment, the Line Item Veto proved, even 
in its limited use, to be too discomforting for many 
members of Congress. As a result there were few who 
decried the Supreme Court's ruling. 
These represent the major political impacts of the 
Line Item Veto Act. None of the changes represented a 
significant shift in budgetary powers. Each could be 
offset in some manner by the other branch of government. 
Rather than threatening the very foundations of the 
legislative system as some opponents had predicted, the 
Line Item Veto had only a small impact on the budgeting 
process. Here again, the main limitation on judging its 
impact is time. Had the measure not been ruled 
unconsti tutional it may well have impacted on the process 
in the manner that many of its opponents feared. 
B. FISCAL IMPACT OF THE LINE ITEM VETO 
For all of the debate about the effect the Line Item 
Veto would have on the budgeting process, its first year 
was less than memorable. President Clinton's use of the 
measure to curtail wasteful spending and force Congress to 
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adopt his spending priori ties was limited. In fact, the 
President had a stronger record of re-shaping legislation 
through rescissions than what he accomplished in his first 
year with the Line Item Veto. 
In 1996, the last year before President Clinton had 
the Line Item Veto, he proposed 24 rescissions totaling 
over $1.4 billion in budget authority. Congress enacted 8 
of his proposed rescissions totaling $963 million. 2 
Al though the number of rescissions requested by President 
'Clinton was less than one-third of the number of his Line 
Item Veto cancellations, the dollar amount was 
significantly higher. In each of his first four years as 
President, the number of rescissions he requested never 
matched the number of his Line Item Veto cancellations for 
1997. (Table (8) shows proposed and enacted rescissions 
for each year of Clinton's presidency through 1996). 
As can be seen from the table, President Clinton was 
relati vely consistent in his use of rescissions. His use 
of the Line Item Veto falls wi thin the range of dollar 
amounts of his previous rescissions. In 1997, the number 
of Line Item Veto cancellations was significantly higher, 
while the dollar amount canceled was roughly the same. 
2 Acting Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, "Summary of Proposed and Enacted 
Rescissions through Fiscal Year 1996, Oct 6, 1997, p. 3. 
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This suggests that he was more precise with the Line Item 
Veto Act than he had been with traditional rescission 
authority. 
'l'abl. (8) 
a.scissions During the Clinton Administration 
Rescissions Proposed by Presidential Proposals Enacted 
Fiscal President Clinton _____ by.£~~~!! _____ 
~.-- ---- --------- ---Year N um ber Dollar Amount Number Dollar Amount 
1993 7 $356 000,000 4 $206,250 000 
1994 65 $3,172,180,000 45 $1,293478 546 
1995 29 $1 199.824 000 25 $845 388 805 
1996 24 $1 425 900 000 8 $963,400 000 
Total 125 $8,153,904,000 12 $3,308,517,351 
Source: General Accountmg OffIce. Comm unlcatlon from the Actmg 
Comptroller General. October 6,1997. 
In every year except 1996, Congress accepted a higher 
percentage of his rescissions than they did his Line Item 
Vetoes. They accepted just under 54 percent (44 out of 82) 
of his Line Item Veto cancellations in 1997. This is 
striking considering the extent to which the Line Item Veto 
Act was supposed to favor the President in a battle over 
cancellations. 
Once again the limited amount of time during which the 
Line Item Veto was available limits our ability to 
interpret this data. It is also true that the rescission 
process is not precisely comparable to the Line Item Veto. 
The President has broader authority to propose rescissions, 
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but less power to implement them as Congress is not 
obligated to consider his proposed rescissions. 
At a minimum, the available data may suggest that even 
with the Line Item Veto Act, Congress retained significant 
authori ty to overturn the President's cancellations. 
Whether this could have been expected to continue in the 
future is unknown. Clearly if the Act was seen to have 
shifted too much power to the President, Congress had the 
power to overturn the Line Item Veto Act on its own, even 
with the threat of a presidential veto. At the very least 
the sunset date would keep any shift in budgetary powers 
from being permanent. 
Congress, on its own, initiated over $28 billion in 
rescissions during President Clinton's first four years. 3 
Congress generally rescinds more budget authority on its 
own than it enacts by request of the President. During 
Bush's Presidency, Congress initiated $26 billion worth of 
rescissions. While in eight years with President Reagan, it 
initiated $33 billion in budget authority.4 
The reasons Congress employs rescissions are 
essentially the same as the President. Changing 
circumstances may make previously enacted budget authority 
3 Ibid., Enel. II. 
4 Ibid. 
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unnecessary. Additionally, Congress uses rescissions to 
offset additional spending in other areas. As 
congressional priorities change, it may cancel spending 
that it had previously passed in favor of its new 
priorities. In order for those rescissions to be 
permanent, they must be passed by both houses of Congress 
and signed into law by the President. 
In 1995, Congress initiated the vast majority of its 








ostensibly part of the new Republican majority's policy to 
reverse the trends of bigger government and uncontrolled 
spending which, they argued, had characterized Democratic 
control of Congress. However, it demonstrates the 
significance of congressional reaction to a relatively 
small amount of canceled budget authority from the MilCon 
bill. 
This information should be considered in light of the 
consternation among members of Congress caused by the Line 
Item Vetoes against the MilCon bill. The explanation for 
their widespread opposition is likely political, especially 
considering the large number of projects canceled by the 
President. That bill alone accounted for more 
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cancellations than the total number of rescissions he had 
requested in three out of his first four years in office. 
Instead of focusing on a few big items he canceled numerous 
smaller ones, raising the ire of many congressmen. It was 
not the total amount of canceled spending that concerned 
members of Congress, but the fact that so many of them had 
been directly affected by those cancellations. 
Clearly President Clinton did not use the Line Item 
Veto to re-shape congressional spending priorities as Nixon 
had done with impoundments. Instead, President Clinton 
used it for what it was best sui ted to accomplish; the 
curtailing of what he considered pork-barrel spending 
(i.e., spending for projects that were not in the 
President's budget). Still, his use of the Line Item Veto 
was measured compared to all of the items on which it could 
have been applied. 
The fact that President Clinton did not focus on using 
the Line Item Veto to reduce the federal deficit, but 
instead to control wasteful spending is clear from any 
cursory look at individual cancellations. There was no 
overriding ideological program he was attempting to 
implement, as Nixon had with his impoundments of funds for 
domestic social programs. Instead, as he said prior to his 
5 Ibid. 117 
1...-_____________________________________________ --
first cancellation, he was simply looking for "sufficiently 
objectionable" items that ought to be vetoed. 6 
The term 'wasteful spending' above is italicized 
because it is subjective. Pri vate negotiations that took 
place during the budgeting process suggest that President 
Clinton was willing to supplant congressional pork with 
executi ve pork whenever possible. 7 In this vein, the Act 
was used as a bargaining tool to ensure presidential 
spending priori ties were in the budget. But, the overall 
fiscal impact of this was negligible. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In its one year, the Line Item Veto clearly had no 
great impact on the budget. While it was responsible for 
introducing some new political dynamics, it failed to 
demonstrate that it represented a tremendous shift in 
budgetary powers to the President. Similarly, the fiscal 
impacts of the measure were unimpressive. While President 
Clinton clearly focused on using the measure to curtail 
pork, it fai led to have any real effect on the federal 
deficit. His Line Item Veto cancellations reduced federal 
6 Clinton, William J., "Press Conference by the President," The White House, Aug 6, 1997. 
7 Taylor, Andrew, 1997, "With CR Done, Focus Now is on Line-Item Veto," Congressional Quarterly, 
(October 4), p. 2387. 
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discretionary spending by just 0.09 percent. 8 Congress and 
the federal courts overturned a significant portion of his 
cancellations, further reducing the fiscal impact of the 
Act. Other factors had helped to reduce the size of the 
deficit in 1997 that were totally unrelated to the Line 
Item veto Act. 
Had the Line Item Veto Act not been subjected to 
rigorous consti tutional scrutiny, its first year may have 
been significantly different. President Clinton may have 
been willing to use the measure more widely, bringing about 
a markedly different conclusion of its overall 
effecti veness and impact. Again, the greatest limitation 
in understanding the significance of the measure on the 
budgeting process is time. Had the measure survived its 
constitutional challenges it could have become a key 
component in the budgeting process. But to what extent it 
would have shifted power from Congress to the President 
cannot be known. 
8 Congressional Budget Office, "The Line Item Veto Act After One Year," CBO Memorandum, (April 
1998), p. 14. 
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APPENDIX A. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION 
The following is a brief analysis of the specific 
provisions of the Line Item Veto Act. 
Cancellation Authority 
The President may cancel in whole-
(1) Any dollar amount of discretionary budget 
authority; 
(2) Any item of new direct spending; or, 
(3) Any limited tax benefit; 
If the President-
(A) Determines that such cancellation will-
1. Reduce the federal budget deficit; 
2. Not impair any essential government functions; 
and, 
3. Not harm the national interest; and, 
(B) Notifies the Congress of such cancellations by 
transmitting a special message within five 
calendar days. 
1. The special message shall specify-
a. The dollar amount canceled, 
b. The determination that none of the three 
requirements in subparagraph (A) are 
violated, 
c. The reasons for the cancellation, 
d. The estimated fiscal, economic, and 
budgetary effects of the cancellation, 
e. All facts and circumstances relating to 
the cancellations, 
f. The corresponding adjustments that will be 
made to the discretionary spending limits. 
2. If the cancellation is of an item of new 
direct spending or discretionary budget 
authority the special message will also 
include-
a. Any account, department, or establishment 
of government for which such budget 
authority was to have been made available, 
b. The specific states and congressional 
districts affected, 
c. The total number of cancellations imposed 
during the current session. 
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Deficit Reduction 
The Office of Management and Budget is charged with 
providing the estimates of each cancellation, in accordance 
with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 
of 1985. For each cancellation of a dollar amount 
discretionary budget authority the discretionary spending 
limits will be reduced by an equal amount. This provision 
is widely referred to as the "lock-boxH mechanism. If 
Congress does not act within the period required to 
introduce a disapproval bill then, after a 10-day period, 
OMB will make the necessary adjustments to the 
discretionary spending limits. 
As soon as practicable the Cqngressional Budget Office 
will make estimates of the reduction in budget authority. 
Such estimates will display the reduction in outlays 
flowing from such reduction of budget authority for each 
out year. 
Expedited Consideration 
The Act provides for a review period of 30 calendar 
days, when both Houses are in session, to introduce a 
disapproval bill. If Congress adjourns at the end of a 
Congress, prior to the end of the 30 day period, and if 
there is a disapproval bill pending, then the Congress will 
have five calendar days of session of the next Congress to 
introduce a disapproval bill for the same special message. 
Consideration in the House of Representatives 
Any committee to which a disapproval bill is referred 
must report it, without amendment, no later than the 
seventh calendar day of session after the date of 
introduction. If the committee fails to report the bill, a 
member who favors the bill can move to discharge the 
committee from further consideration of the bill. 
After a disapproval bill is reported or a committee 
has been discharged from further consideration the bill 
moves to the floor. If reported and the report has been 
available for at least one calendar day, all points of 
order against the bill and against consideration of the 
bill are waived. Votes to reconsider are not in order. 
General debate shall not exceed one hour, equally divided 
between a proponent and an opponent of the bill. 
Amendments may be offered under the five minute rule and 
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are limited to striking specific reference number items 
within the bill, or adding a reference number that was in 
the original special message, but subsequently left out of 
the disapproval bill. 
Debate of the conference bill, if necessary, is also 
limited to one hour. 
Consideration in the Senate 
Any disapproval bill will be sent to the appropriate 
committee which will have seven days to report the bill. 
If they fail to report the bill within that time, they will 
be discharged from further consideration and the bill will 
be placed on the calendar. If the Senate receives a 
disapproval bill from the House of Representatives, it will 
be immediately placed on the calendar without being 
referred to committee. 
Amendments are similarly limited in the Senate. 
Definitions 
(1) Cancel- To rescind any dollar amount of discretionary 
budget authority. With respect to any item of new direct 
spending or limited tax benefit, to prevent such budget 
authority from having legal force. 
(2) Disapproval bill- Any bill or joint resolution which 
only disapproves one or more cancellations. 
(3) Dollar amount of discretionary budget authority- The 
entire dollar amount of budget authority specified in an 
appropriation law or the amount of budget authority 
required to be allocated by a specific proviso in an 
appropriation law for which a specific dollar figure was 
not included. It does not include direct spending. 
(4) Item of direct spending- Any specific provision of law 
that is estimated to result in an increase in budget 
authority or outlays for direct spending relative to the 
most recent levels calculated in the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
(5) Limited tax benefit- Any revenue-losing provision which 
provides a Federal tax deduction, credit, exclusion, or 
preference to 100 or fewer beneficiaries under the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, in any fiscal year for which the 
provision is in effect. Also, any federal tax provision 
which provides temporary or permanent transitional relief 
for 10 or fewer beneficiaries. 
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Identification of Limited Tax Benefits 
The Joint Committee on Taxation must review any 
revenue or reconciliation bill or other such legislation 
that contains a tax adjustment and provide a statement to 
the conference committee charged with drafting the final 
version of the pertinent bill, identifying any limited tax 
benefits. If none are identified, then the Joint Committee 
will prepare a statement that no such limited tax benefit 
exists. 
Judicial Review 
Anyone who is adversely affected by the Act may bring 
an action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia for declaratory judgement and 
injunctive relief on the grounds that it violates the 
Constitution. Such actions have the right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The District Court is to expedite, to the 
maximum extent possible, the disposition of any matter 
brought against the Act. 
Effective Dates 
The Act becomes effective on the earlier of either the 
day after the enactment into law of a plan to balance the 
budget in seven years, or January 1, 1997. The act shall 
have no effect on or after January 1, 2005. 
Source: Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly 
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APPENDIX B. HISTORY OF THE LINE ITEM VETO ACT 
This table provides a brief overview of the key dates and 












104 tn Congress convenes with a Republican 
majority. One of their major objectives is 
passage of the Line Item Veto. 
The House of Representatives passes H.R. 2, a 
bill to provide the Line Item Veto to the 
President. The bill passes 294-134. 
The Senate passes S-4, a significantly different 
measure than H.R. 2. It seeks to provide the 
same power to the President but through a method 
called 'separate enrollment.' The measure 
passes 69-29. 
After a lengthy conference, the House and Senate 
approve a compromise version of the Line Item 
Veto. The measure passes the Senate on 3-27-96 
by a vote of 69-31. The following day the House 
passes this version by attaching it to a rule. 
The rule passes 232-177. 
President Clinton signs the Line Item Veto Act 
into law as P.L. 104-130. 
The Line Item Veto Act becomes effective for use 
by President Clinton. 
Senator Byrd and five other congressmen file 
suit for summary judgement in federal district 
court, seeking to have the Line Item Veto Act 
ruled unconstitutional. 
Judge Jackson finds for the plaintiffs, ruling 
that the Line Item Veto Act is unconstitutional. 
It is the responsibility of Congress to make the 
nation's laws, he says, not the President. 












Supreme Court vacates Judge Jackson's Ruling. 
Justices say that the plaintiffs lack legal 
standing to sue because they have not been 
injured by the Act and dismiss the case. 
President Clinton exercises the Line Item Veto 
Act for the first time in history on two 
provisions from the Taxpayer Relief Act and one 
provision from the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. 
President Clinton cancels 38 items from the 
Military Construction Appropriations Act. The 
cancellations are broadly opposed in Congress. 
President Clinton makes one cancellation from 
the Treasury Appropriations Act. The 
cancellation is on the FERS open season 
provision which would allow federal employees to 
switch from the Civil Service Retirement System 
to FERS. 
The House and Senate pass the Military 
Construction (MiICon) Disapproval bill to 
overturn all 38 of the President's· 
cancellations. This is the first such bill to 
ever pass Congress. It first passes in the 
House by a vote of 352-64. The next day it 
passes in the Senate by a vote of 69-30. 
President Clinton vetoes the MilCon Disapproval 
Bill. This is the first such veto. Congress 
adjourns sine die this same day so no further 
action is taken on the bill during the first 
session of the 105th Congress. 
The FERS open season cancellation is overturned 
by Judge Hogan in federal district court. The 
ruling is part of an agreement between the NTEU 
and the Department of Justice. Judge Hogan does 
not rule on another part of their lawsuit which 
claims the Act is unconstitutional. 
Judge Hogan hears case brought by the City of 
New York and the Snake River Potato Growers who 
claim personal injury because of the Act. The 








Judge Hogan rules in favor of the plaintiffs. 
In a summary judgment he finds that the Act is 
unconstitutional because it violates the 
Presentment Clause of the Constitution. 
The House votes to override the President's veto 
of the MilCon Disapproval Bill by a vote of 
347-69. 
The Senate votes to override the President's 
veto of the MilCon Disapproval Bill by a vote of 
78-20. 
Supreme Court upholds Judge Hogan's ruling in 
the case of the City of New York and the Snake 
River Potato Growers. The justices determine 
that the Act circumvents the exhaustive process 
involved in making the nation's laws. The 
Constitution, they say, does not give the 
President the power to unilaterally alter 
legislation after he signs it into law. 
After three weeks of trying to determine what to 
do with the 1997 cancellations, the Office of 
Management and Budget decides to release the 
funds immediately. 
Source: Congressional Record and Congressional Quarterly. 
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